



SUFFICIENTLY CRIMINAL TIES: 
EXPANDING VAWA CRIMINAL  
JURISDICTION FOR  
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MAURA DOUGLAS† 
The commitment to bring safety and justice and restore the sacredness of women 
has only just begun; the sovereignty of women has always been sacred.1 
American Indian and Alaska Native women face the highest rates of sexual assault 
of any group in the United States, and most often such attacks are by non-Indian 
offenders. Since Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, tribes cannot exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, even for crimes committed against an Indian 
victim in federally recognized Indian country. A history of complex jurisdictional and 
intergovernmental issues between federal, state, and tribal authorities further impede 
the investigation and prosecution of these crimes. In the Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA 2013), Congress extended criminal jurisdiction 
to tribes in a limited context over non-Indian defendants—so long as they possess ties 
to the tribe and to the victim as a domestic or dating partner. The requirement that 
a defendant must have a relationship with the victim, tribe, and land is novel. 
Indeed, during the VAWA 2013 legislative debates weighing the jurisdictional grant, 
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even Senate opposition conceded that once jurisdiction was extended to crimes of 
domestic violence, “there would be no principled reason not to extend it to other 
offenses as well.” Federal Indian law affirms Congress’s plenary authority to recognize 
tribal sovereignty, but does the law require special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction for tribes to be so restricted? I argue it does not. This Comment first 
investigates the history of jurisdiction in Indian country and recognition of inherent 
tribal sovereignty by Congress. Second, it considers the problem of sexual violence in 
Indian country. Third, it assesses the main arguments in opposition to the current 
jurisdictional grant in VAWA 2013 to determine whether Congress can and should 
recognize tribal authority to prosecute all non-Indian crimes of sexual violence, as 
well as concurrent crimes of domestic and dating violence, committed against Indian 
victims in Indian country. In light of these oppositional arguments, this Comment 
argues that Congress can and should recognize such jurisdictional authority of tribal 
governments, and proposes specific language to affirm the inherent powers of tribes to 
further protect their land and their people. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Victims of sexual assault suffer one of the greatest attacks on their human 
rights: the right to be free from violence and to maintain their own bodily 
sovereignty. American Indian2 women face the highest rates of sexual assault 
of any group in the United States, and indigenous feminism recognizes the 
intersectional impact of race, gender, and colonization on those lived 
experiences.3 Vice President Biden—who originally introduced the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA) to Congress in 19904—received a letter in 2011, 
right before the Act’s reauthorization was being considered, from Assistant 
Attorney General Ronald Weich stating that violence against American Indian 
and Alaska Native women was and should be considered an “epidemic.”5 Non-
Indian perpetrators in particular feel, and seemingly can be, immune from 
prosecution due to the complexities of jurisdictional authority between tribal, 
state, and federal governments over non-Indian defendants in Indian country.6 
 
2 I will use the term “American Indian” or “Indian” to describe indigenous women living in the 
lower forty-eight states, as this is the most common terminology used in scholarship. See generally 
ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 134 (7th ed. 2015). 
3 See SARAH DEER, THE BEGINNING AND END OF RAPE: CONFRONTING SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE IN NATIVE AMERICA 88 (2015) (“Like intersectional feminism, indigenous feminism 
considers gender and race—but also the role of colonization in the lives of Native women.”). More 
than one in three American Indian women are raped in their lifetime, at least according to reported 
data. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 22 
(Nov. 2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7VB-XTWB]; see 
also Timothy Williams, For Native American Women, Scourge of Rape, Rare Justice, N.Y. TIMES (May 
22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/23/us/native-americans-struggle-with-high-rate-of-
rape.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/TKF9-67EA]. This is very likely to be a significant 
underestimation of the actual statistics. For a discussion of the challenges of collecting data related 
to sexual violence against Indian women, and added complications due to questions of jurisdiction, 
such as siphoning results between on-reservation violence and off-reservation violence, see generally 
DEER, supra note 3, at 7-9; infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
4 About Vice President Biden’s Efforts to End Violence Against Women, WHITE HOUSE, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/1is2many/about [https://perma.cc/P8ZD-N5JR]. 
5 Letter from Ronald Weich, Asst. Att’y Gen. to Sen. Joseph A. Biden, President of the U.S. 
Senate 1 (Jul. 21, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/legacy/2014/02/06/legislative- 
proposal-violence-against-native-women.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VCR-LX9W]. 
6 The term “Indian country” is defined under federal Indian Law as: 
(a) [A]ll land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government . . . 
(b) [A]ll dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States 
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether 
within or without the limits of a state, and 
(c) [A]ll Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, 
including rights-of-way running through the same. 
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
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After the Supreme Court’s decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
tribal governments could not criminally prosecute non-Indian defendants, 
even for committing a crime against an Indian victim in Indian country.7 The 
Bureau of Justice Statistics has reported previously that in over eighty percent 
of reported incidents of rape or sexual assault of American Indian victims, 
the perpetrator was identified as white (nearly four in five cases) or black 
(nearly one in ten).8 Only the federal government—or in some limited 
circumstances, state governments9—could exercise jurisdiction over cases 
involving a non-Indian and Indian party.10 But with scant resources, and 
where sometimes a federal prosecutor or police agency could be hundreds of 
miles away, these incidents are frequently under-investigated, under-
reported, and under-enforced.11 Jurisdictional deficiencies and tribes’ 
inability to prosecute non-Indian offenders created a system where, according 
to Amnesty International, non-Indians could rape American Indian women 
with near impunity.12 
Congressional response to this epidemic culminated in Title IX of the 
VAWA Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA 2013). Congress recognized what 
was coined special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction to participating 
tribes for a “very narrow set of cases over non-Indians who voluntarily and 
knowingly established significant ties to the tribe.”13 While predominantly 
viewed as a tremendous victory for tribal communities, and for tribal 
 
7 See 435 U.S. 191, 194, 212 (1978) (finding a tribe did not have jurisdiction over two non-Indian 
residents who were charged with assaulting tribal officers and resisting arrest and engaging in a high-
speed chase, respectively, in Indian country). 
8 STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992-
2002: AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 9 (Dec. 2004), https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QJ7Y-Q7S2]; see also DEER, supra note 3, at 6 (“The original 1999 Bureau of Justice 
Statistics report concluded that about nine in ten American Indian victims of rape or sexual assault 
had white or black assailants.”). 
9 See infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (discussing Public Law 280, which provided for 
the transfer of federal jurisdiction to states in certain cases). 
10 See infra Section I.C. 
11 See Timothy Williams, Higher Crime, Fewer Charges on Indian Land, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/us/on-indian-reservations-higher-crime-and-fewer-prosecutions. 
html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/M7M9-8F5D] (“Tao Etpison, former chief judge of the Tonto 
Apaches in Arizona, said federal prosecutors typically live, work and try cases hundreds of miles from 
Indian Country.”); see also Sari Horwitz, New Law Offers Protection to Abused Native American Women, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new-law-
offers-a-sliver-of-protection-to-abused-native-american-women/2014/02/08/0466d1ae-8f73-11e3-84e1-
27626c5ef5fb_story.html [https://perma.cc/MY2F-D6PW] (“U.S. attorneys . . . are often hundreds of 
miles away from rural reservations. It can take hours or days for them to respond to allegations, if they 
respond at all, tribal leaders say.”). 
12 See AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN 
FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 5 (2007) (“Indigenous women described to Amnesty International 
how they experience contemporary sexual violence as a legacy of impunity for past atrocities.”). 
13 S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 10 (2012). 
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sovereignty since Oliphant, VAWA 2013 intentionally qualified the 
jurisdictional power of tribal governments with several limitations. First, to 
lawfully exercise the jurisdiction, tribal governments must afford defendants 
certain constitutional and procedural rights that Congress had not otherwise 
required tribes to provide. 
Second, the tribal prosecution must show that the non-Indian defendant 
has a connection to both the tribe—through employment, residence, and/or 
intimate relationship with an Indian—and to the Indian victim, because the 
statute only recognizes tribal jurisdiction over crimes of domestic and dating 
violence, as well as violations of protective orders. Thus, the “sufficient ties” 
jurisdictional requirement here extends beyond the common understanding 
of a sovereign’s criminal jurisdictional authority to (at minimum) prosecute 
crimes by any party within its territorial bounds.14 Tribal jurisdiction over 
logically connected or similar crimes, identified below, is not recognized: 
Crimes between two non-Indians; [c]rimes between two strangers, including 
sexual assaults; [c]rimes committed by a person who lacks sufficient ties to 
the tribe, such as living or working on its reservation; and [c]hild abuse or 
elder abuse that does not involve the violation of a protection order.15 
The legislative record of these VAWA 2013 provisions reflects the ongoing 
tension between Congress’s plenary power16 to recognize tribal authority and 
whether the exercise of such recognized authority stems from federal authority 
or from the tribe’s inherent sovereignty—the bounds of which have yet to be 
adequately defined by Congress or the Court. 
Ultimately, the substantial limitations of special domestic violence tribal 
jurisdiction do not find support in the historical recognition of tribal 
sovereignty and power. Specifically, that a defendant must have a relationship 
with the victim, the tribe, and the land (with the crime committed thereon) is 
novel. Even Senate opposition to the legislation conceded that once the 
jurisdiction was extended to crimes of domestic violence, “there would be no 
 
14 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 & cmt. c (1987) 
(recognizing a sovereign’s jurisdiction to prescribe law to “conduct that wholly or in substantial part, 
takes place within its territory,” and that the “territorial principle is by far the most common basis for 
the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe”); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, 
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
1, 23 (2002) (“Territoriality was integral to nineteenth century concepts of sovereignty because, under 
international law principles, a sovereign’s jurisdiction to legally regulate conduct was coterminous with 
its territory.”); cf. Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 975-76 (2002) (noting that a state’s criminal authority is, in general, “territorially 
limited,” with the controversy being extraterritorial reach, not authority within a state’s own borders). 
15 VAWA 2013 and Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes of Domestic Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
(June 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/legacy/2014/02/06/vawa-2013-tribal-
jurisdiction-overnon-indian-perpetrators-domesticviolence.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9MN-MMLG]. 
16 See infra notes 36–40, 57 and accompanying text. 
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principled reason not to extend it to other offenses as well.”17 While tribes were 
unable to prosecute non-Indians at all after Oliphant and before VAWA 2013, 
the express limitations of the jurisdictional grant require further examination 
in light of history, policy, and congressional intent to determine whether 
further extending tribal jurisdictional authority is lawful and warranted. 
If Congress was constitutionally able to recognize inherent tribal 
sovereignty to prosecute some non-Indians for certain enumerated crimes 
committed in Indian country, subject to additional restrictions, then should it 
follow that tribes possess the same sovereignty to exercise jurisdiction over 
non-Indians committing any sexually violent crime or applicable concurrent 
crime against an Indian within Indian country? That is the focus of this 
Comment—considering the issue of jurisdiction over crimes committed within, 
not outside of, Indian country. Part I will review the historical underpinnings 
to the jurisdictional landscape in Indian country and the relationship between 
federal and tribal governments before and after Oliphant. Part II provides an 
empirical overview of the issue of sexual violence in Indian country, which will 
shed light on why Congress chose to recognize tribal authority to prosecute 
some non-Indian crimes within Indian country under VAWA 2013 in the first 
place.18 Part III outlines the text of VAWA 2013 as enacted, and then considers 
the main arguments against the Act’s limited jurisdictional grant for tribes: 
first, that such a grant would violate the constitutional rights of non-Indian 
defendants; and second, that even if those rights could be protected, Congress 
cannot constitutionally recognize inherent tribal sovereignty over non-Indians, 
and as such, exercising this jurisdiction would be use of congressionally 
delegated authority subject to the Constitution. These arguments, which 
ultimately failed in Congress, will be applied to a hypothetical law extending 
tribal criminal jurisdiction to crimes of sexual violence by non-Indian 
defendants with no identifiable connection to an Indian victim in Indian 
country, and all concurrent crimes of domestic and dating violence, such as 
child abuse and endangerment. Part IV provides information on current 
implementation of the special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction in 
participating tribes, and proposed language for extending tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over all non-Indian defendants who commit crimes of sexual 
assault/rape, domestic violence (including concurrent crimes such as child or 
elder abuse), and dating violence against Indians in Indian country. 
 
17 S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 48 (2012). Then-Senator Jeff Sessions, who is the sitting Attorney 
General, was one of the four drafters of the Minority Views. 
18 A point of clarification is needed regarding male victims. Despite the law’s title, VAWA is 
gender-neutral; thus, any modifications to the jurisdictional grant in Indian country would also cover 
male victims. Although much of the statistics discussed in this Comment focus specifically on female 
victims, proposed amendments and additional grants of tribal jurisdictions are intended to cover 
male victims as well. 
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Before considering the legislative record and language of VAWA 2013 (as 
well as proposed amendments), it is important to briefly review the history 
of tribal criminal jurisdiction and the evolution of relations between tribes 
and federal and state governments. 
I. TRIBAL–FEDERAL RELATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY 
The relationship between the federal government, states, and Indian tribes 
is colored by an incredibly complicated history. Criminal jurisdiction within 
Indian country has been particularly fractured during this history. It has been 
concurrently or exclusively exercised to varying degrees by and between tribal, 
state, and federal governments depending on the type of crime and the identities 
of both the victim and perpetrator. And despite the universal right to be free 
from bodily harm,19 actions by both Congress and the federal courts have 
systematically damaged the means by which tribes can protect the health, safety 
and welfare of their tribal members, which is a fundamental attribute of 
sovereignty.20 Of course, early European colonization also substantially 
threatened tribal sovereignty and established the use of both physical and sexual 
violence of Indians as a means of conquest and territorial expansion.21 
Traditional procedural and legal doctrine provides that a sovereign may 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed in its own territory.22 
 
19 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
20 Cf. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apace Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 140-42 (1982) (discussing the taxing power 
as an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty to protect people, self-govern, and manage territory). 
21 See, e.g., ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE, AND AMERICAN INDIAN 
GENOCIDE 7-33 (2005) (describing sexual violence as a tool of genocide, used by early colonists 
against American Indian women); see also, e.g., Letter from Michele de Cuneo to Christopher 
Columbus dated Oct. 28, 1495, in JOURNALS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ON THE LIFE AND 
VOYAGES OF CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS 212 (Samuel Eliot Morison trans., 1963) (“I wanted to 
put my desire [for a Carib girl] into execution but she did not want it . . . . I took a rope and thrashed 
her well, for which she raised such unheard of screams that you would not have believed your ears. 
Finally we came to an agreement . . . .”); Letter from Christopher Columbus to Dona Juana de 
Torres, Nurse of Prince John, in AMERICAN JOURNEYS COLLECTION 378 (George F. Barwick 
trans., Wisc. Historical Soc’y Dig. Library and Archives ed., 2003) (Fall 1500) (“A hundred 
castellanos are as easily obtained for a woman as for a farm . . . and there are plenty of dealers who 
go about looking for [American Indian] girls; those from nine to ten are now in demand, and for all 
ages a good price must be paid.”). For a more detailed consideration of the colonial period and early 
treatment of American Indians, see generally ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIZ, AN INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES’ HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2015). For consideration of how colonialism and loss 
of cultural affiliation is connected to the high rates of victimization of and violence against American 
Indians, or what Barbara Perry calls “ethnoviolence,” see generally Barbara Perry, From Ethnocide to 
Ethnoviolence: Layers of Native American Victimization, 5 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 231 (2002). 
22 See, e.g., 13 WALTER MALINS ROSE & W.A. SUTHERLAND, INDEX TO THE TWELVE 
VOLUMES OF NOTES ON THE UNITED STATES REPORTS, 909 (1901) (“[A] State has jurisdiction 
of all things within its territorial boundaries.”); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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Indeed, a “basic attribute of full territorial sovereignty is the power to enforce 
laws against all who come within the sovereign’s territory, whether citizens or 
aliens.”23 This general premise does not, however, apply to tribal jurisdiction 
or to claims arising in Indian country. In order for a tribal court to lawfully 
exercise jurisdiction over a case, there must be both subject matter 
jurisdiction, established under federal and tribal law, as well as personal 
jurisdiction.24 Currently, a tribe may exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
actions involving exclusively Indian parties, but not non-Indians, unless 
authorized by federal statute.25 Otherwise, any crime—including domestic 
and sexual violence—committed by a non-Indian against an Indian on tribal 
land can only be prosecuted by the federal government or the state authorized 
to do so under what is known as Public Law 280.26 
This “jurisdictional maze” of tribal criminal jurisdiction created gaps in 
the deterrence of criminal behavior and the protection of vulnerable victims.27 
Scholar Angela Riley explains the jurisdictional dilemmas in Indian country: 
[T]he remaining gaps in criminal jurisdiction left exclusively under the 
authority of the federal government have never been adequately filled. The 
bizarre result is that criminal jurisdiction over Indian country crimes is 
governed by shifting and sometimes contradictory variables, including where 
the crime was committed, whether both the defendant and victims are 
Indians, and the classification of the alleged crime, among other 
considerations.28 
A brief, though by no means exhaustive, historical overview of the 
jurisdiction, policy, and intersovereign tensions in Indian country will help 
inform the specific challenges of investigating and prosecuting crimes of sexual 
violence committed by non-Indians against Indian victims in Indian country. 
 
23 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990). 
24 FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, §§ 7.02(1)–(2) (Nell 
Jessup Newton ed., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. 
25 See Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564, 1587 
(2016) (“[W]hen a non-Indian commits a crime against an Indian in Indian country—absent a unique 
statutory modification—the only sovereign with jurisdictional authority is the federal government.”). 
26 In enacting Public Law 280, the federal government transferred its jurisdictional powers in 
Indian country to some states, leaving it an option for states to exercise jurisdiction. See Act of Aug. 
15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, §§ 2, 7, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162) [hereinafter 
PL-280]. State jurisdiction in Indian country under PL-280 was later amended to require tribal 
consent. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–23. For an overview of the jurisdictional 
triad of crimes in Indian country, see AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 12, at 31; infra note 78. 
27 Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional 
Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 504 (1976). 
28 Riley, supra note 25, at 1575. 
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A. Early Tribal–Federal Relations  
Though tribes existed well before the Constitution and the federalist 
structure of the U.S. government were established, the history of federal 
Indian policy underscores the substantial erosion of tribal sovereignty and the 
individual rights of Indians at the hands of Congress and the federal courts.29 
Before European colonization and the development of the United States, 
some American Indian tribes had already established systems of law and 
governance.30 When tribes entered into treaties with the United States in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, they were considered sovereign 
entities, distinct from states.31 Further, federal courts interpreted treaties 
with a “full appreciation of the Indian understanding of the deal” because 
 
29 See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 556-67 (1981) (holding that tribes 
presumptively lacked authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian-owned 
land within a reservation, subject to certain exceptions); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 
U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (denying tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants). The executive 
branch has also, at times, undermined the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes. See, e.g., CLINTON 
ET AL., supra note 2, at 20-22 (discussing the influence of President Andrew Jackson during the 
Removal Era, whose federal Indian policy forcibly removed thousands of Indians from their land 
and pushed them westward). 
30 See Gavin Clarkson & David DeKorte, Unguarded Indians: The Complete Failure of the Post-
Oliphant Guardian and the Dual-Edged Nature of Parens Patriae, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1127-28 (2010) 
(“Prior to European colonization of the Americas, many tribes had developed systems of law and justice, 
contrary to myths that no such systems existed.”). Indeed, the oral constitution of the Iroquois 
Confederacy, known as the “Great Law of Peace,” was used as a model of effective government for the 
early American colonists. See H.R. Con. Res. 331, 102 Stat. 4932 (1988) (“[T]he confederation of the 
original Thirteen Colonies into one republic was influenced by the political system developed by the 
Iroquois Confederacy as were many of the democratic principles which were incorporated into the 
Constitution itself . . . .”). See generally DONALD A. GRINDE, JR., & BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, EXEMPLAR 
OF LIBERTY: NATIVE AMERICA AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY (1991) (providing an 
extensive overview of evidence and arguments to support the “Iroquois Influence Thesis”). 
31 See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the Proceedings (Feb. 26, 1793), in THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 340-41 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905) (“The Indians 
had the full, undivided and independent sovereignty as long as they chose to keep it, and this might be 
forever.”). This view of tribal sovereignty changed in the nineteenth century. See 6 REG. DEB. 1035 (1830) 
(quoting the same passage from Jefferson, a congressman then reasoned: “Sir, there is no man who has a 
higher reverence for the opinions of Mr. Jefferson . . . but if he intended to be understood as advancing 
the opinion that the Indian tribes possess entire and unlimited sovereignty over the country which they 
claim, I cannot yield my assent”). Compare Treaty of Hopewell, art. 5, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18 (noting 
that if a U.S. citizen settled on recognized Indian land, “such person shall forfeit the protection of the 
United States, and the Indians may punish him or not as they please”), with Worcester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 580 (1832) (“At no time has the sovereignty of the country been recognized as existing 
in the Indians, but they have been always admitted to possess many of the attributes of sovereignty.”). 
But even in the twenty-first century, tribal sovereignty is incredibly difficult to define. See President 
George W. Bush, Remarks at the UNITY Journalists of Color Conference (Aug. 6, 2004), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdimK1onR4o [https:/perma.cc/9GJQ-7GWB] (answering a 
question about what tribal sovereignty means: “Tribal sovereignty means that: it’s sovereign . . . . You’ve 
been given sovereignty and you’re viewed as a sovereign entity. And, therefore, the relationship between 
the federal government [and American Indian tribes] is one between sovereign entities.”). 
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they were considered separate sovereigns, and thus deserved the comity 
afforded other sovereigns.32 
However, throughout the nineteenth century, significant shifts in 
federal–Indian relations altered the landscape of tribal powers and inherent 
tribal sovereignty. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, decided in 1831 and the first 
Supreme Court case involving a tribe as a named party, Chief Justice 
Marshall referred to tribes as “domestic dependent nations” rather than 
wholly sovereign nations.33 He held that the Supreme Court could not 
maintain jurisdiction over the tribe as a party because they were neither a 
state nor a foreign nation.34 Tribal sovereignty was still recognized, but 
federal guardianship over tribes was formally acknowledged and justified by 
the Court. Only one year later, in Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall 
emphasized that the Cherokee Nation was a distinct community with 
inherent sovereignty and authority to make and enforce laws within their 
own lands, and that the federal government, not states, managed tribal 
relationships.35 Worcester stood for the proposition that tribes did have 
inherent sovereignty, but it became evident that the federal government was 
asserting more control than ever before. 
The text of the Constitution did not provide express power to the federal 
government to regulate “internal Indian affairs” of the (once-considered 
extremely autonomous) tribes, but the gradual encroachment into such affairs 
was quickly affirmed by “plenary congressional power.”36 This power—a new 
phenomenon in the mid-nineteenth century, but later deemed a power “from 
 
32 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 204 (citing Marshall’s majority opinion in Worcester 
and Justice McLean’s concurring opinion in Worcester as evidence that the Justices were trying to 
interpret the treaty as the Indian party were to understand it, not just how the federal government 
would). For a discussion of shifting historical models of treaties between tribes and the federal 
government, see generally id. at 4-12. 
33 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
34 See id. at 27 (“The argument is that they were states; and if not states of the union, must be 
foreign states. But I think it very clear that the [C]onstitution neither speaks of them as states or 
foreign states, but as just what they were, Indian tribes.”). Three opinions handed down by Chief 
Justice Marshall became pivotal cases in federal Indian law, known as “The Marshall Trilogy”: 
Worcester, 31 U.S. 515; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1; Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
35 See 31 U.S. at 520 (finding unconstitutional a state law that prosecuted white individuals for 
not having a license to be in Indian country because it would “interfere forcibly with the relations 
established between the United States and the Cherokee nation”). 
36 Cleveland, supra note 14, at 25-26; see also id. at 46 (discussing United States v. Rogers and 
arguing that the Supreme Court found that “discovery, and the resulting presence of [an Indian] tribe 
within U.S. boundaries, gave Congress plenary authority to legislate a criminal code for the Indians”). 
The Constitution mentions Indians or Indian tribes in the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8 (delineating Congress’ power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes”), and in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 and U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 2 (excluding Indians not taxed from consideration of how to apportion representation). 
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the beginning”37—grew teeth primarily during the so-called Removal 
Period.38 In 1871, Congress passed the Indian Appropriations Act, which 
ended formal treaty-making with Indian tribes.39 Further, the Supreme Court 
found Congress possessed the power to unilaterally abrogate treaty 
provisions.40 While this congressional action ended a form of external tribal 
sovereignty, it did not suggest that tribes lost their power of self-government 
and internal sovereignty. 
As shifts in federal policy towards Indian tribes evolved dramatically in 
the nineteenth century, so too did federal recognition of tribal jurisdiction in 
Indian country—but some evidence suggests that exercising broad criminal 
jurisdiction in its territory was historically an inherent power of a tribe. 
B. Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country Pre-Oliphant 
The historically recognized metes and bounds of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction, especially over non-Indians, are relatively unsettled, and such an 
investigation falls outside the scope of this Comment. This Section shows 
that the historical record reflects evidence of at least some tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country, and that the federal 
government recognized this power as inherent in tribal sovereignty. 
1. Tribal Jurisdiction 
Conflicting arguments exist as to whether tribes ever possessed authority 
to prosecute non-Indian crime committed in Indian country, and if so, 
whether it was concurrent with federal authority, or at times exclusive. 
Frequently, the same primary source can be interpreted to make contrary 
conclusions regarding the power of tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians. Take, for example, an 1834 House Report recommending 
the enactment of the “Western Territory Bill.”41 Justice Rehnquist in Oliphant 
 
37 Infra note 40. 
38 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 29, at 20-22; see also Cleveland, supra note 14, at 42-44 
(noting that the first half of the nineteenth century was marked by tribal control over “conduct 
between Indians in Indian territory,” but that a clear shift occurred throughout the century where 
the federal government asserted more control). 
39 See Indian Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 466 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71) 
(“[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe . . . shall be recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or 
power with whom the United States may contract by treaty . . . .”). 
40 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over the tribal 
relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning . . . .”). The plenary 
power of Congress over Indian affairs, recognized in Lone Wolf, was not actually referred to as 
“plenary” before then, but now is part of general federal Indian law doctrine. See, e.g., United States 
v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 194 (2004) (“The Constitution . . . grants Congress ‘plenary and exclusive’ 
powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes.” (emphasis added)). 
41 H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, 18 (1834). 
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buttressed his argument that tribal courts were not historically recognized to 
possess “criminal jurisdiction over United States officials and citizens 
traveling through the area” by quoting language in this Report.42 Viewed in 
a different light, however, this 1834 Report supports an opposing argument. 
Russel Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson highlighted 
several flaws in Rehnquist’s reliance on this primary source: 
To begin with, the bill was tabled; a fact which Justice Rehnquist reserved for 
the footnotes. The bill therefore reflects the views of a single committee, not 
Congress. Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist stopped short of quoting all of the 
1834 report’s “practical reasons.” What he omitted is enlight[e]ning: “[A]s to 
those persons not required to reside in the Indian country, who voluntarily 
go there to reside, they must be considered as voluntarily submitting to the 
laws of the tribes. . . . [t]he right of self-government is secured to each tribe, 
with jurisdiction over all persons and property within its limits, subject to 
certain exceptions, founded on principles analogous to international laws 
among civilized nations.” . . . In another footnote he admits that the 
Western Territory Bill “did not extend the protection of the United States 
to non-Indians who settled without Government business in Indian 
territory.” This technique has been seen before. In the text, facts are 
presented and a strong conclusion is drawn: “Indian tribal courts were 
without jurisdiction to try non-Indians.” Then, in the footnotes, 
contradictions in the facts are admitted. The product is a kind of half-truth.43 
While only one example, the 1834 House Report reflects the disparate 
treatment of primary resources to determine the historical views, practices, and 
policies of tribal criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on tribal lands. 
In any event, there is evidence beyond this Report suggesting that it 
was early federal policy to recognize tribal jurisdiction over offenses by 
non-Indians if they were committed on tribal land—evidence of both 
exclusive and concurrent tribal jurisdiction.44 Early versions of tribal 
 
42 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 202. Rehnquist quoted the Report in multiple parts of the opinion, 
writing in sum the Report demonstrated that “Congress shared the view of the Executive Branch and 
lower federal courts that Indian tribal courts were without jurisdiction to try non-Indians.” Id. at 203. 
43 Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609, 625-26 (1979) 
(footnotes and citations omitted). 
44 See Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater than the Sum 
of the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391, 400 & n.31, 403 n.43 (1993) (describing supporting evidence 
for tribes possessing the authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction in certain capacities over 
non-Indians after the founding of the Republic, including among others several treaties, and 
findings by the Department of Interior and the American Indian Policy Commission); cf. Barsh 
& Henderson, supra note 43, at 620 (criticizing Justice Rehnquist for citing in Oliphant only 6 
of 366 ratified U.S.–Indian treaties to “conclude[] that tribal treaties acquiesced in a historical 
federal policy against tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians”). For a more detailed review 
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criminal authority over non-Indians existed through consent of the non-Indian 
party—traditionally through citizenship, naturalization or intermarriage. For 
example, the Cherokee Nation, recognized in a treaty with the United States 
in 1866, maintained “exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases 
arising within their country in which members of the nation, by nativity or 
adoption, shall be the only parties, or where the cause of action shall arise in 
the Cherokee Nation.”45 Paul Spruhan identified through his research similar 
provisions in treaties with the Seminoles46, the Creeks47, and the Choctaw 
and the Chickasaw Nations.48 Even if a treaty recognized federal jurisdiction 
in Indian country, it was not necessarily addressing the scope of tribal 
jurisdiction, and frequently, such “protection” of federal laws was not for 
non-Indians who lived in Indian country.49 At minimum, these treaties 
highlight some recognition from the federal government that certain tribes 
possessed jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country as part of their 
inherent power to govern their own land. 
 
of the evidence of tribal jurisdiction in the colonial era, see generally LISA FORD, SETTLER 
SOVEREIGNTY 55-85 (2010); see also id. at 59-60 (“[T]he reach of indigenous jurisdiction is most 
apparent in the very paucity of settler law in and around Indian country . . . . The status of 
settler–sojourners under law and treaty confirms that Indian Country was both a place of 
territorial exception and a place of overlapping jurisdictions.”). 
45 Treaty with the Cherokee Nation, art. 13 July 19, 1866; see Paul Spruhan, “Indians, in a 
Jurisdictional Sense”: Tribal Citizenship and Other Forms of Non-Indian Consent to Tribal Criminal 
Jurisdiction, 1 AM. INDIAN L.J. 79, 84 & n.44 (2012) (quoting the same treaty passage, and referencing 
other treaties illustrating tribal criminal authority over naturalized white persons). Spruhan argues 
that the 1866 treaty with the Cherokee Nation—because it granted “exclusive” criminal jurisdiction 
over adopted or naturalized citizens—overturned United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846), which 
had earlier held that the federal government could exercise criminal jurisdiction over a white man 
who married into the Cherokee Nation. Id. at 85.  
Citizenship through consent, adoption, or intermarriage is rarely seen currently, and tribal 
citizenship for federal law purposes most often turns on a combination of factors that include blood 
quantum. See id. at 91; U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, A GUIDE TO TRACING AMERICAN INDIAN & 
ALASKA NATIVE ANCESTRY 2, https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia_prod.opengov.ibmcloud.com/files/
assets/public/pdf/Guide_to_Tracing_AI_and_AN_Ancestry.pdf [https://perma.cc/PC4V-L9QJ] 
(determining eligibility for tribal membership requires, according to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
that an individual first “establish that you have a lineal ancestor—biological parent, grandparent, 
great-grandparent and/or more distant ancestor—who is an American Indian or Alaska Native 
person from a federally recognized tribe in the U.S.”). 
46 See Spruhan, supra note 45, at 85 (“The Seminoles similarly stated in their treaty that ‘the laws 
of said nation shall be equally binding upon all persons of whatever race or color, who may be adopted 
as citizens or members of said tribe.’” (quoting Treaty with the Seminoles, art. 2 Mar. 21, 1866)). 
47 See id. (noting that “[t]he Creeks included an almost identical provision in their [1866] 
treaty” as the Seminoles). 
48 See id. at 84 (“In their collective 1866 treaty, the Choctaws and Chickasaws similarly reserved 
such right over intermarried white persons residing on tribal lands or who had been adopted by 
legislative action.”). 
49 See FORD, supra note 44, at 60 (citing treaties, such as the Treaty of Holston and the Treaty 
of New York, where non-Indians, who “shall settle on any of the [Cherokee or Creek] lands,” 
forfeited protection); see also Treaty of Hopewell, supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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The records of Benjamin Hawkins, the principle Indian agent to the 
Creek Tribe in the early nineteenth century, also reflect the occurrence of 
trials by the Creek National Council, whereby the Tribe exercised jurisdiction 
over non-Indians.50 Hawkins “supervised the trials of a number of settlers by 
the Creek National Council,” including the whipping of a white man who 
attempted to steal a slave.51 And as scholar Lisa Ford notes, even with 
potential elements of “federal imperialism” infused into the Creek National 
Council, “it nevertheless dispensed, and was understood by settlers to dispense, 
Creek jurisdiction over settlers.”52 
In addition to certain limited authority over non-Indians, whether 
concurrent or exclusive with the federal government in Indian country, tribes 
maintained exclusive criminal jurisdiction over Indian-on-Indian crime in 
Indian country until the late nineteenth century.53 This recognition of tribal 
criminal jurisdiction (as inherent tribal sovereignty) was acknowledged in Ex 
Parte Crow Dog, where it was determined that federal courts did not have 
jurisdiction to prosecute an Indian accused of murdering another Indian in 
Indian country.54 The Crow Dog decision was made at a time when federal 
Indian policy was drastically stretching federal power into Indian country, 
and it was not long before Congress reacted. 
2. Concurrent Tribal, State and/or Federal Jurisdiction 
By 1817, the federal government had already extended federal criminal 
jurisdiction to Indian country for non-Indian crime, unless a treaty said 
otherwise.55 Then, almost immediately following the decision in Crow Dog, 
Congress passed the Major Crimes Act of 1885, which extended federal 
criminal jurisdiction over certain major crimes committed by Indians in 
Indian country—thus eliminating tribe’s once exclusive jurisdiction over 
 
50 See FORD, supra note 44, at 61 (citing Hawkins’ letters to Thomas Jefferson and James Jackson). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. (emphasis added). 
53 See General Crimes Act of 1817, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (extending federal criminal jurisdiction to 
all crimes committed in Indian country, except for Indian-on-Indian crime, or where an Indian was 
already punished by tribal law, or if a legitimate treaty said otherwise); infra note 56 and 
accompanying text (discussing how the Major Crimes Act limited exclusive tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over certain crimes involving only Indian parties). 
54 See 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883) (extending jurisdiction to federal courts would, according to the 
Court, “reverse . . . the general policy of the government towards the Indians” and would require a 
clear expression of intent from Congress). This is in stark contrast to Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning 
in Oliphant. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
55 18 U.S.C. § 1152. 
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Indian-on-Indian crime.56 The Major Crimes Act did not, however, reference 
the scope of exercising tribal jurisdiction. 
By the twentieth century, as federal Indian policy reverted back to 
recognizing inherent tribal sovereignty, this shift was colored by the expanded 
recognition of congressional “plenary” powers over Indian affairs.57 These 
conflicting principles particularly exacerbated jurisdictional shifts. In 1953, 
Congress passed Public Law 280 (PL-280), allowing for the transfer of federal 
civil and criminal jurisdiction in Indian country to states—though it did not 
preempt tribal jurisdiction.58 Publicly, congressional intent behind PL-280 
was to address the “lawlessness on the reservations and the accompanying 
threat to non-Indians living nearby.”59 Functionally, however, its passage led 
the federal government to withdraw significant funding from those states 
exercising PL-280 jurisdiction.60 After the law was enacted, the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs dramatically reduced federal funding to tribes to support law 
enforcement activities before PL-280 states had put in place systems to assert 
jurisdiction in Indian country.61 
 
56 Major Crimes Act of 1885, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Congressional authority to enact such legislation 
was not found in any positive source of law, but rather in Congress’s general “ownership of the 
country,” including the territory occupied by Indian tribes, and the need to protect tribes themselves 
due to the federal trust relationship. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380, 384 (1886). The 
Kagama Court did not address the scope of tribal jurisdiction, however. 
57 Compare Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 553 (1903) (“Congress has always exercised 
plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians and the power has always been deemed a 
political one not subject to be controlled by the courts.”), with The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 
25 U.S.C. §§ 476–78 (authorizing the Secretary of the BIA to approve tribal constitutions and charters 
of incorporation for tribes, reinvigorating a policy of tribal self-determination). In a Bureau of Indian 
Affairs Report from the same year the IRA was passed, the Solicitor of the Interior acknowledged the 
plenary powers of Congress, but noted that tribes maintain jurisdiction over non-Indians “save as it 
has been expressly limited by” Congress. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 57 (1934); see also 
Brief for Historians and Legal Scholars Supporting Respondents at 7, Dollar General Corp. v. 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496) (quoting the same passage). 
58 PL-280, supra note 26; see also Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Nothing 
in the wording of Public Law 280 or its legislative history precludes concurrent tribal authority.”). 
Before PL-280 was passed, states possessed some jurisdictional authority in Indian country: for 
crimes where both parties were non-Indian. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 623-24 
(1882) (holding that Colorado, not the federal government, had criminal jurisdiction over a murder 
committed on an Indian reservation between non-Indians); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra 
note 24, § 9.02(10)(a). 
59 Clarkson & DeKorte, supra note 30, at 1137. 
60 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 541 (“[T]he major point of Public Law 280 was to divest 
the federal government of fiscal responsibility for such policing, not to curtail the long-recognized 
inherent sovereignty of the tribes over such matters.”). 
61 See infra text accompanying note 109 (quoting a report that found tribal police forces have 
55-75 percent of the resources available to non-Indian communities); Catherine T. Struve, The Story 
of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Tribal Sovereignty, Sex Equality, and the Federal Courts, in FEDERAL 
COURTS STORIES 301, 306 (Vicki Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2009) (“A widespread problem that 
surfaced under Public Law 280 was that states lacked resources and perhaps inclination to provide 
adequate law enforcement on many reservations.”). 
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When PL-280 was originally passed, Congress did not require tribal 
consent for states to assert jurisdiction in Indian country. The Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) was a step taken by Congress to require such 
consent, and in addition, permit states to return jurisdiction back to the 
federal government.62 However, the ICRA concomitantly reflected the 
tension between recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty and congressional 
plenary power over Indian tribes. While the ICRA mandated tribal consent 
for new state assumptions of PL-280 jurisdiction in Indian country, it also 
enforced the guarantee of certain constitutional rights in tribal courts and 
limited tribal sentencing authority to maximum terms of imprisonment and 
fines.63 This included rape, which normally carries a sentence of between 
eight and twelve years in state or federal courts.64 After being amended by 
the Tribal Law and Order Act in 2010, the ICRA now provides for a 
maximum term of three years for any one offense, such as rape.65 
Further, the ICRA imposed restraints on tribal governments to recognize 
certain constitutional rights of defendants—restraints not previously placed 
upon them, since tribes are not bound by the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth 
Amendment.66 At the time, there was concern67 that tribal courts would be 
unable to afford non-Indian individuals the same constitutional protections and 
due process that state or federal courts could, instilling a notion of tribal 
government as a “second-class system of justice that encourages law breaking.”68 
 
62 Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202(7), 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 
U.S.C §§ 1301–03). 
63 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012) (discussing limits on tribal power). When the ICRA was first 
enacted in 1968, Congress limited tribal government’s sentencing authority to imposing sentences of 
up to six months and five hundred dollars. Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202(7), 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (prior to 
1986 amendment). In amendments to the ICRA, Congress limited tribes to imposing sentences of up 
to one year and five thousand dollars. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-146 (1986). The Tribal 
Law and Order Act expanded tribal sentencing power in 2010, limiting tribes to imposing sentences of 
up to three years and fifteen thousand dollars for any one offense (with a total sentencing limit of nine 
years). 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(7), 1302(b) (2012). 
64 See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 12, at 8 (“The average prison sentence for rape handed down by 
state or federal courts is between eight years and eight months and 12 years and 10 months respectively.”). 
65 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(7), 1302(b). 
66 § 1302; see Struve, supra note 61, at 301-03 (describing a case where the plaintiffs sued an 
Indian tribe under the Equal Protection clause of ICRA, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, 
because tribes “are not bound by the Constitution’s Bill of Rights or by the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); see also infra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court precedent 
holding that tribes are not bound by the Constitution except where a provision applies universally, 
such as the Thirteenth Amendment). 
67 For a more detailed overview of the hearings and concerns expressed in Congress before the 
ICRA was enacted, see Struve, supra note 61, at 306-11. 
68 Williams, supra note 11. The ICRA was amended in 1990 to recognize tribal inherent 
sovereignty to prosecute nonmember Indians who commit crimes on their land. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2). 
This was known as the Duro fix following a Supreme Court opinion that held tribes could not 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
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C. Policy, Jurisdiction, and Oliphant in Indian Country 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, federal courts began developing 
common-law doctrine regarding jurisdiction that limited the exercise of tribal 
sovereignty. This was most evident in the Court’s decision in Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe.69 Two non-Indians were charged with resisting arrest, 
assaulting a tribal officer, and recklessly endangering another person after 
colliding with a tribal police car during a high-speed chase.70 While the tribe 
argued they had jurisdiction, stemming from their retained inherent powers, 
the Court rejected inherent tribal sovereignty to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians.71 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Court, 
believed that historical evidence suggested there was no such jurisdiction 
without an express grant from Congress, but noted that Congress had the 
power to enact legislation providing for such jurisdiction.72 
Two justices on the Oliphant Court felt the analysis should be flipped: the 
tribe maintains jurisdiction in Indian country as part of their inherent 
sovereignty unless it was affirmatively taken away by Congress.73 The dissent 
foreshadowed practical problems with the Court’s decision to reject tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country, which effectively 
compounded enforcement challenges in Indian country.74 Eliminating the 
inherent sovereign right to exercise jurisdiction over all crimes committed 
within their own land stripped tribes of a core sovereign prerogative to 
protect their people and promote order within their borders.75 The Oliphant 
majority revealed the little faith held by the federal government—through 
judicial common law-making—in tribes to protect their own citizens. It also 
emphasized the unique state of jurisdictional play in Indian country: “the 
only place within the United States where the racial and political status of the 
 
69 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Decided only weeks after Oliphant, the Wheeler opinion found that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to a tribe’s prosecution and federal 
prosecution of the same Indian defendant for the same crime because the tribal exercise of its power 
to punish member offenses was a “continued exercise of retained tribal sovereignty.” 435 U.S. 313, 
323-24 (1978). Thus, the principle of inherent tribal sovereignty was not lost at the time of Oliphant, 
even if it was substantially threatened. 
70 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194. 
71 Id. at 196-97. 
72 See id. at 208 (“Indians do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative 
delegation of such power by Congress.” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 
207 (2004) (“[W]e do not read any of these cases [including Oliphant] as holding that the Constitution 
forbids Congress to change ‘judicially made’ federal Indian law through this kind of legislation.”). 
73 435 U.S. at 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
74 See infra Section II.B. 
75 See Riley, supra note 25, at 1581 (discussing the effect of Oliphant on crime and justice in 
Indian country). 
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perpetrator and victim bear on the question of which sovereign may exercise 
jurisdiction in a given instance.”76 
After Oliphant, criminal jurisdiction in Indian country rests on three key factors, 
divided or shared among tribal, state, or federal entities: (i) the nature of the 
offense; (ii) whether jurisdiction has been conferred on the state; and (iii) whether 
the victim and/or the perpetrator is an Indian.77 Investigators and prosecutors alike 
must know where a crime occurred, who the victim was, and who the perpetrator 
was before determining the appropriate means of legal redress.78 
 
76 Id. 
77 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 
§ 674, https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-674-indian-country-introduction 
[https://perma.cc/Q9GB-2ZCC]. 
78 The Department of Justice published a chart, reprinted below, in its Criminal Resource 
Manual to U.S. attorneys, to summarize the complexities of jurisdiction in Indian country 
depending on the source of jurisdiction: 
 
OFFENDER VICTIM JURISDICTION (NOT CONFERRED ON STATE) 
Non-Indian Non-Indian State jurisdiction is exclusive of federal and tribal jurisdiction. 
Non-Indian Indian 
Federal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 is exclusive of state 
and tribal jurisdiction. 
Indian Non-Indian 
If listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1153, there is federal jurisdiction, 
exclusive of the state, but probably not of the tribe.  
If the listed offense is not otherwise defined and punished by 
federal law applicable in the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, state law is assimilated.  
If not listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1153, there is federal jurisdiction, 
exclusive of the state, but not of the tribe, under 18 U.S.C. § 1152.  
If the offense is not defined and punished by a statute 
applicable within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, state law is assimilated under 
18 U.S.C. § 13.
Indian Indian 
If the offense is listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1153, there is federal 
jurisdiction, exclusive of the state, but probably not of the tribe.  
If the listed offense is not otherwise defined and punished by 
federal law applicable in the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, state law is assimilated. See 
section 1153(b).  
If not listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1153, tribal jurisdiction is exclusive. 
Non-Indian Victimless 
State jurisdiction is exclusive, although federal jurisdiction may 
attach if an impact on individual Indian or tribal interest is clear. 
Indian Victimless 
There may be both federal and tribal jurisdiction. Under the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, all state gaming laws, 
regulatory as well as criminal, are assimilated into federal law 
and exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the United States. 
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In sum, since the founding of the United States, Indian tribes have lost 
much of their land, sovereign rights, and powers, but that reality cannot 
conceal the history of tribal jurisdiction in Indian country and tribes’ 
existence as sovereigns. Gaps in jurisdiction, in particular, left an already 
vulnerable population even more susceptible to abuse. Ultimately, the 
jurisdictional complications in Indian country, which created a sense of 
lawlessness, pushed Congress to reconsider the disproportionate impacts of 
this procedural anomaly on victims, specifically Indian women. 
 
OFFENDER VICTIM JURISDICTION (UNDER PUB. L. 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162) 
Non-Indian Non-Indian State jurisdiction is exclusive of federal and tribal jurisdiction. 
Non-Indian Indian 
“Mandatory” state has jurisdiction exclusive of federal and 
tribal jurisdiction. “Option” state and federal government have 
jurisdiction. There is no tribal jurisdiction. 
Indian Non-Indian 
“Mandatory” state has jurisdiction exclusive of federal 
government but not necessarily of the tribe. “Option” state has 
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts. 
Indian Indian 
“Mandatory” state has jurisdiction exclusive of federal 
government but not necessarily of the tribe. “Option” state has 
concurrent jurisdiction with tribal courts for all offenses, and 
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts for those listed 
in 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
Non-Indian Victimless 
State jurisdiction is exclusive, although federal jurisdiction may 
attach in an option state if impact on individual Indian or tribal 
interest is clear.
Indian Victimless 
There may be concurrent state, tribal, and in an option state, 
federal jurisdiction. There is no state regulatory jurisdiction. 
OFFENDER VICTIM JURISDICTION (CONFERRED BY ANOTHER STATUTE) 
Non-Indian Non-Indian State jurisdiction is exclusive of federal and tribal jurisdiction. 
Non-Indian Indian 
Unless otherwise expressly provided, there is concurrent federal 
and state jurisdiction exclusive of tribal jurisdiction. 
Indian Non-Indian 
Unless otherwise expressly provided, state has concurrent 
jurisdiction with federal and tribal courts. 
Indian Indian 
State has concurrent jurisdiction with tribal courts for all offenses, 
and concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts for those listed 
in 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
Non-Indian Victimless 
State jurisdiction is exclusive, although federal jurisdiction may 
attach if impact on individual Indian or tribal interest is clear. 
Indian Victimless 
There may be concurrent state, federal and tribal jurisdiction. 
There is no state regulatory jurisdiction. 
  
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 
689, https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-689-jurisdictional-summary [https://
perma.cc/DCJ6-QSB7]. 
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II. THE JURISDICTIONAL MAZE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 
IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
The historical erosion of tribal authority illustrated in Part I left Indian 
women living in Indian country significantly under-protected from strangers 
and even from their own bedfellows. After Oliphant but before VAWA 2013, 
tribes could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants 
committing crimes against Indians in Indian country.79 This left the federal 
government (and sometimes states) as the sovereign to prosecute and 
investigate non-Indian crime against Indians. In practice, the federal 
government declined to prosecute nearly half of reported cases of sexual 
assault in Indian country between 2005 and 2009, due to “weak or insufficient 
admissible evidence.”80 Further, reports show that attackers would even call 
“the tribal police themselves, knowing there would not be a response, arrest, 
or prosecution.”81 This sense of lawlessness directly contributed to deeply 
troubling statistics of sexual and physical violence against Indian victims. 
A. Data on Violence Against American Indians/Alaska Natives 
Although rape and sexual violence against Indian victims are not new 
phenomena,82 media attention and recent studies have attempted to shed 
light on the extent and severity of the problem, for policymakers, police, and 
the broader public. 
Studies highlight the problem of sexual assault against Indian victims, and, 
in particular, the high rates of violent crimes committed against Indians as 
compared to victims who do not identify as Indian. For example, a 2003 
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Research Report presented findings from 
the National Violence Against Women (NVAW) Survey to better understand 
violence against women in the United States, and to review key findings for 
women of color’s experiences with violence in particular.83 The NVAW Survey 
data reported that 34.1 percent of respondents who identified as American 
Indian/Alaska Native women reported being raped, compared to 17.7 percent 
of respondents who identified as white, 18.8 percent who identified as black, 
 
79 See supra Section I.B (detailing the Court’s decision in Oliphant and its effect on criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country). 
80 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-167R, DECLINATIONS OF INDIAN 
COUNTRY MATTERS 3 (2010). 
81 Riley supra note 25, at 1582; see also Horwitz, supra note 11 (“One time after her husband beat 
her, [the victim] said, he picked up the phone and called the sheriff to report the incident himself to 
show that he couldn’t be arrested . . . . He knew, she said, there was nothing the sheriff could do.”). 
82 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting the prevalence of sexual violence against 
American Indians since the early colonial period). 
83 TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 3, at iii. 
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and 6.8 percent who identified as Asian/Pacific Islander.84 In fact, according 
to the data, American Indian/Alaska Native respondents (both male and 
female) had the highest rates across each type of victimization: rape, physical 
assault, and stalking.85 Another report, published by the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) in 1999, found that, while seventy 
percent of all American Indian victims described their attacker as white (sixty 
percent) or black (ten percent), victims of rape or sexual assault “most often 
reported that the victimization involved an offender of a different race. About 
ninety percent of American Indian victims of rape or sexual assault were 
estimated to have had assailants who were white or black.”86 
The 1999 BJS Report also found that the rate of violent victimizations for 
American Indians was more than double the rate for the U.S. resident 
population.87 The 2003 NIJ Report on the NVAW findings concluded that 
American Indian/Alaska Natives were at high risk of being violently 
victimized, but “how much of the variance in violent victimization that may 
be explained by demographic, social, and environmental factors remains 
unclear and requires further study.”88 
While recent data is not ultimately conclusive on the exact percentage of 
offenders who are strangers, acquaintances, family members, or intimate 
partners, it is evident that Indian victims experience violence at the hands of 
perpetrators who are not just spouses or dating partners. For example, the data 
analyzed in the 1999 BJS Report reflected that forty-six percent of violent 
victimizations of American Indian victims, including but not limited to 
 
84 Id. at 22; see also Clarkson & Dekorte, supra note 30, at 1119 (“American Indian females are 
victims of violence more than two and a half times the national average . . . What is even more 
troublesome is that in more than 90% of these cases, the offender is a non-Indian.”). 
85 TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 3, at 22. 
86 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND 
CRIME 7 (Feb. 1999), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7D6-JK46]. 
The BJS Report also found that 
Most striking among American Indian victims of violence is the substantial difference 
in the racial composition of offenders in intimate violence incidents when contrasted 
with family violence. Among violence victims of all races, about 11% of intimate victims 
and 5% of family victims report the offender to have been of a different race; however, 
among American Indian victims of violence, 75% of the intimate victimizations and 25% 
of the family victimizations involved an offender of a different race. 
Id. at 8. 
87 Id. at v. 
88 TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 3, at 23. Congress recognized this problem when the 
Violence Against Women Act was being reauthorized in 2005, requiring the NIJ to “conduct a 
national baseline study to examine violence against Indian women in Indian country” and create a 
Task Force to develop and implement the study and its recommendations. Violence Against Women 
and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 904(a), 119 Stat. 
2960, 3078-79 (2006); see also infra note 113 and accompanying text (explaining Congress’s purpose 
in enacting VAWA 2005). 
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rape/sexual assault, were committed by a stranger, thirty-eight percent by an 
acquaintance, seven percent by a family member, and eight percent by an intimate 
partner.89 Amnesty International found that of the reported sexually violent 
attacks against American Indian or Alaska Native women, only twenty-five 
percent were committed by an intimate partner.90 And a study funded in part by 
the NIJ, which analyzed data collected by the National Crime Victimization 
Survey from 1992 to 2005, determined that thirty-eight percent of reported 
rapes/sexual assaults of American Indian/Alaska Native women were committed 
by an intimate partner, and twenty-nine percent by a stranger.91 
Data collection for violence within Indian country and against Indian 
victims can be challenging, and generalizations regarding Indian country and 
tribes should be made with extreme caution, given variations in size, 
demographics, geographic remoteness, and local and state relations.92 The 
Ten Tribes Study was a collaborative effort between the University of 
Arizona, the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, and several 
tribes to overcome some of these challenges by gathering data from diverse 
tribes. The goals of the Ten Tribes Study were,  
(a) to determine the prevalence rates of adulthood physical assault and rape 
among men and women across six tribes, (b) describe victim–perpetrator 
relationships, and (c) identify the contributions of demographic characteristics, 
adverse childhood experiences, lifetime alcohol dependence, and cultural and 
regional factors to risks of adult victimization.93  
The Study asked respondents to categorize their offender as (i) male and 
female relatives, (ii) other known persons, (iii) romantic partners, and (iv) 
strangers.94 In cases of physical assault, adult female victims reported the 
 
89 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 86, at 6. 
90 Id. 
91 RONET BACHMAN ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE 
WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN 38 (Aug. 2008), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223691.pdf [https://perma.cc/7699-BG5P]. 
92 See generally Nicole P. Yuan et al., Risk Factors for Physical Assault and Rape Among Six Native 
American Tribes, 21 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1566, 1568 (2006) (“Although violence research 
with Native Americans is growing, there are limited empirical data on the multiple vulnerabilities 
experienced by this population.”). This Study noted limitations in its own data collection: 
“prevalence rates might have been underestimated due to reporting bias and that bias might have 
varied by tribe. Participants might have adapted their responses because of shame and guilty, 
concerns about confidentiality, and limited anonymity . . . .” Id. at 1584. For more general reasons 
for differences across studies, not just within—such as sampling differences, screening questions, 
and cultural sensitivity of interviewers—see BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 91, at 61-66. For a detailed 
overview of relevant studies conducted at the local level before 2007, including information on data 
collection methods, sample demographics, and results, see id. at 157-67. 
93 Yuan et al., supra note 92, at 1568. 
94 Id. at 1572. Ninety-six percent of the sample reported “living within tribal lands or 
boundaries.” Id. at 1575. 
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most common offender was a romantic partner (eighty percent).95 In cases of 
sexual assault, “the most frequently reported perpetrator was a male relative 
(55%), followed by romantic partner (46%), other known person (29%), 
stranger (28%), and female relative (4%).”96 While these categories clearly 
overlap, the drop in reporting perpetrators as a romantic partner from eighty 
percent in physical assault cases, to forty-six percent in sexual assault cases, is 
quite notable. 
In addition to methodological challenges in data collection, the number 
of assaults are likely underreported.97 Thus, available statistics likely are a 
gross underestimate.98 Some victims and advocates of sexual assault in Indian 
country report that women growing up among the violence in Indian country 
normalize it, expecting it to occur and even preparing for it.99 This may also be 
due to strained relations between victims of sexual assault and law enforcement, 
and in the case of Indian victims, who the appropriate enforcement agency is. 
B. Investigating and Prosecuting Crimes in Indian Country 
The problem of sexual violence against Indian victims is compounded by 
delays and declinations for investigation units and prosecutors—in many ways 
due to the fractured jurisdictional plane in which Indian country resides.100 
Data collected from the federal government, academic institutions, and 
other advocacy organizations all reflect the glaring problem that crimes of 
sexual violence in Indian country occur at much higher rates and are 
prosecuted at lower rates than similar crimes in state territory, and even at 
 
95 Id. at 1577. 
96 Id. 
97 This is not unique to American Indian victims. See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY 
THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE VICTIMIZATION: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 32 (Jan. 2006), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/210346.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/94GL-NJEJ] (“Survey findings confirm previous research that shows rape is a 
seriously underreported crime. Only 19.1 percent of the women and 12.9 percent of the men who 
were raped since their 18th birthday said their rape was reported to the police.”). 
98 See, e.g., Riley supra note 25, at 1605 (noting that tribes engaged in the VAWA pilot project 
pointed to a “sharp increase in reporting of domestic violence as another sign that the laws are having 
a positive impact. . . . Those working in tribal criminal justice posit that this is because victims 
believe they are safer than before, and that their abusers will not automatically walk free due to 
jurisdictional loopholes.”); AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 12, at 33 (discussing an interview with a 
support worker in Oklahoma who said, “of her 77 active cases of sexual and domestic violence 
involving Native American women, only three women had reported their cases to the police”). 
99 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 3 (“[Rape is] more expected than unexpected. It has become 
the norm for young women . . . .” (quoting a women’s health advocate in South Dakota)). 
100 See infra notes 101–104 and accompanying text. 
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lower rates than other serious crimes committed in Indian country.101 For 
example, federal prosecutors did not file charges in fifty-two percent of the 
“most serious crimes” committed on tribal land in 2011, but declined to pursue 
sixty-five percent of alleged rapes and sixty-one percent of cases involving 
sexual abuse of children.102 This data should also be considered with the 
background of the jurisdictional history and forced assimilation that took 
place on federally recognized tribal land. Higher rates of poverty, less access 
to law enforcement, and the remoteness of the land are in many ways a direct 
result of that history of colonization.103 
Given the complexity of jurisdiction in Indian country, depending on the 
nature of the offense, the location of the crime, and the race and ethnicity of 
the parties, there can be several different offices involved in the investigation 
of one crime: Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officers, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) officers, tribal government officials, and state police 
officers.104 Given these different players, some reports have found respective 
agencies could be slower to investigate crimes in Indian country because they 
feel another agency should be the primary enforcer.105 Unique questions of 
 
101 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 80, at 8-11 (noting the lower 
prosecution rate of sexual abuse matters compared to assault matters). 
102 Williams, supra note 11. Some scholars argue that tribal authorities (who exercise appropriate 
criminal jurisdiction) are more effective at investigating and charging such crimes. See, e.g., AMNESTY 
INT’L, supra note 12, at 64 (noting that in 2002, the Navajo Nation Department of Public Safety Officers 
investigated 99 rape cases and made charges in 58 of them). For a critical response to the argument that 
federal prosecutors are more likely to decline sexual assaults involving Indian women in Indian country, 
see Gretchen C.F. Shappert, Justice in Indian Country, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2007), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-oewshappert16aug16-story.html [https://perma.cc/EBL3-
3N57]. Shappert argued that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of North Carolina 
“does not []decline to prosecute violent crimes committed in Indian country, particularly those 
perpetrated by non-Indians against Indians that lack state or tribal court jurisdiction.” Id. 
103 See, e.g., AGTUCA, supra note 1, at 28 (“The answer that links these responses together is 
the nature and circumstance of U.S. colonization of the indigenous peoples of North America.”); 
BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 91, at 67 (“Historical and ongoing marginalization in terms of social, 
economic and political rights places American Indian and Alaska Natives at greater risk for 
victimization than other groups who did not share similar historical inequalities.”). 
104 BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 91, at 78-79. Bachman identified in 2006 that there were “over 
170 law enforcement agencies operated by tribal law enforcement, and 37 operated by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs.” Id. at 80. These agencies face significant challenges to enforcing the law: 
Like many rural law enforcement agencies, these officials suffer from departmental and 
administrative problems in addition to geographical, social and economic barriers to connect 
with victims. Although these issues are not unique to American Indian and Alaska Native 
women, scholars frequently argue that problems are intensified on tribal lands due to cultural 
insensitivity, jurisdictional confusion and the extreme isolation of many reservations. 
Id. 
105 Id. at 81-82; see also AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 12, at 44-46 (highlighting delays from 
multiple enforcement agencies in Alaska: “Because of delays in response by State Troopers, [village 
police officers] are often the first to respond to reports of crimes . . . . Although they may be the 
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enforcement create significant delays, which, while a concern for addressing 
any crime, particularly impacts the investigation of sexually violent crimes, 
where review of evidence such as rape kits is required as soon as possible 
following the crime.106 To illustrate how jurisdictional confusion impacts 
investigation, Bachman and her colleagues excerpted the Final Report of the 
Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force which identified: 
The first enforcement officials called to the scene may be tribal police of [sic] 
BIA . . . officers, and these officers may initiate investigation and/or detain a 
suspect. Then a decision has to be made whether the crime is of the type 
warranting federal intervention, and then federal law enforcement officials 
(usually the FBI) need[] to be notified. These officers then decide if they will 
refer the case to the U.S. Attorney’s office. After referral, the U.S. Attorney may 
call for further investigation, pursue prosecution, or dismiss the case.107 
In addition to delays due to jurisdictional questions, funding is also a 
significant problem for agencies responsible for investigating crimes in Indian 
country. Limited funding may result in inadequate training, understaffed 
agencies, lower salaries for officers, and poor data collection tools.108 In a 2001 
report published by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Wakeling and his 
colleagues found that tribal police forces have “between 55 and 80 percent of 
the resource base available to non-Indian communities,” despite higher rates 
of violent crime and other unique challenges.109 
Amnesty International’s 2007 “Maze of Injustice” Report became one of 
the most influential studies that led to greater national attention toward the 
problem of sexual violence in Indian country.110 The Report discussed the 
specific challenges of prosecuting crimes in Indian country because of 
 
first or only officers to respond, [they] cannot serve arrest warrants or investigate serious crimes 
such as rape without the approval of State Troopers.”); STEWART WAKELING ET AL., NAT’L INST. 
OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICING ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 43-45 
(July 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188095.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3C9-V7DG] (discussing 
how jurisdictional complexities and “multiple lines of authority decrease accountability and create 
tribal capacity vacuums”). 
106 Investigations of sexual assault, particularly rape kits, generally require examination of the 
victim immediately following the alleged attack to determine the likelihood of an assault and 
preserve biological materials that could be used as evidence. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible 
Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (2017) (“A rape kit, or 
forensic sexual assault examination, collects and preserves evidence obtained through an invasive 
physical examination of the victim, including hair, fibers, semen, saliva, skin cells, and blood.”). 
107 BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 91, at 82. 
108 WAKELING ET AL., supra note 105, at 26. 
109 Id. at 27. 
110 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 12, at 1; see CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 166 (2d ed. 2015) (“Th[e Amnesty International] report brought 
national and international attention to high crime rates on Indian reservations. Soon thereafter, 
several legislative initiatives were launched.”). 
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jurisdictional deficiencies, the history of colonization, as well as the immense 
dearth of law enforcement resources, training, and funding for criminal 
investigations in Indian country.111 
It became more and more evident that the system of policing was not 
effective in Indian country, and was not protecting those most vulnerable. As 
Wakeling and his colleagues found: 
Strong evidence points to longstanding, cumulative negative effects of 
Federal policy on the practice of policing in Indian Country. The historical 
record shows how Federal policy created a system that served the interests of 
the U.S. government and nontribal citizens and failed to promote the ability 
of Indian nations to design and exert meaningful control over their own 
policing institutions. Departments administered by the BIA are not agents of 
tribes but of the Federal Government and, as such, have limited incentive to 
look to the communities they serve for legitimacy or for authorization of the 
police function. Over time, this arrangement has created a significant gap 
between tribal police and the communities they serve, a gap that is reflected 
in mismatches between police and community priorities and between police 
methods and tribal norms and values.112 
The statistics on crime and the challenges to policing in Indian country 
provoked an evident need for legal reform of related federal policies in Indian 
country, and Congress took notice. 
C. Congressionally-Authorized Studies in VAWA 2005 
Concern related to sexual violence in Indian country began to percolate 
in Washington, D.C. and across the country. In the 2005 Reauthorization of 
the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA 2005”), Congress made direct 
reference to the need for more federal resources to “assist tribal governments 
in safeguarding the lives of Indian women,” yet was not prepared to hand back 
the reins (even concurrently) of criminal prosecution of non-Indians to the 
tribal governments themselves.113 Instead, VAWA 2005 authorized a taskforce 
 
111 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 12, at 43 (noting that as of 2006, the Standing Rock 
Police Department consisted of up to nine patrol officers and investigators overseeing 2.3 million 
acres of land, with sometimes only one officer on duty for the entire Reservation). 
112 WAKELING ET AL., supra note 105, at viii. 
113 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-162, §§ 901(5)-(6), 119 Stat. 3078 (2005) [hereinafter VAWA 2005]; see also Amanda M.K. 
Pacheco, Broken Traditions: Overcoming the Jurisdictional Maze to Protect Native American Women from 
Sexual Violence, 11 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 2 (2009) (discussing Congress’s recognition of 
extremely high sexual assault statistics); cf. § 905(d) (granting tribal access to national criminal 
databases and creating a national tribal sex offender registry in hopes of enhancing transparency and 
security for Indian women). The national studies were also intended to specifically examine not only 
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to support NIJ in conducting a study to establish a baseline assessment of 
violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women, not limited 
solely to domestic or dating violence.114 Publishing their 2010 findings from 
the National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, NIJ concluded 
that 56.1 percent of American Indian/Alaska Native women experienced 
sexual violence, and 96 percent of those victims experienced these attacks at 
the hands of non-Indian perpetrators.115 
Increased attention on crime within Indian country may also have 
improved responses by law enforcement to investigate reported offenses. For 
example, the DOJ reported in 2014 that between 2009 and 2012, the number 
of cases filed in Indian country against defendants increased by approximately 
fifty-four percent, though the overall declination rate remained steady.116 
Though the statistics paint varying pictures of the state of sexual assault 
in Indian country, and how often those crimes are committed by non-Indians 
and by domestic partners, relatives, or strangers, it is evident that sexual 
violence is rampant in Indian country, regardless of the identity of the 
perpetrator and relationship to the victim. And jurisdictional fragmentation 
of this land, coupled with victim silence and under-enforcement, has created 
what a tribal judge called a “perfect storm.”117 Thus, Congress incorporated a 
partial Oliphant fix to address some of these concerns by enacting VAWA 2013, 
because congressional action was “required to eliminate the possibility that 
complex jurisdictional rules and legislation in practice may deny survivors of 
sexual violence access to justice.”118 
 
the violence against women, but also the effectiveness of federal, state and tribal enforcement 
responses to such violence. Id. 
114 VAWA 2005, supra note 113, §§ 901–04. 
115 ANDRÉ B. ROSAY, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE 
AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND MEN: 2010 FINDINGS FROM 
THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 11 (May 2016). 
116 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDIAN COUNTRY INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 4, 23 
(2014), https://www.justice.gov/tribal/file/796976/download [https://perma.cc/67TB-D2MZ]. Of the 
cases that the DOJ declined to prosecute, nearly sixty percent were due to insufficient evidence, but over 
seventy-three percent of sexual assault cases were declined due to insufficient evidence. Id. at 29-30, 37. 
The next most common reason for declining to prosecute was “referral to diff[erent] jurisdiction.” Id. 
117 Tribal Justice: Prosecuting Non-Native for Sexual Assault on Reservations, (PBS NewsHour 
broadcast Sept. 5, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/tribal-justice-prosecuting-non-natives-
sexual-assault-indian-reservations/ [https://perma.cc/U2EL-TPD9] (statement of Theresa Pouley, 
Chief Judge, Tulalip Tribal Court). 
118 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 12, at 8. 
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III. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: VAWA 2013 
Congress has the authority to recognize aspects of tribal sovereignty, which 
includes affirming jurisdiction on tribal lands.119 While Oliphant divested tribes 
of their right to prosecute non-Indian crime in Indian country, Justice Rehnquist 
noted that the Court was “not unaware of the prevalence of non-Indian crime 
on today’s reservations . . . . But these are considerations for Congress to weigh 
in deciding whether Indian tribes should finally be authorized to try non-
Indians.”120 Janet Reno, the U.S. Attorney General during the Clinton 
Administration, remarked that even though federal authorities had a 
responsibility to enforce the law, “tribal justice systems are ultimately the most 
appropriate institutions for maintaining order in tribal communities.”121 
A. Twenty-First Century Legislative Action 
Congress recognized in VAWA 2005 that more funding, resources, and 
research were required to address the problem of sexual assault of Indians in 
Indian country.122 With increased reporting and recognition that tribes could 
be a more effective means of protecting Indian victims in Indian country than 
any other sovereigns, Congress became pressed to expressly act. 
First, Congress passed in 2010 the Tribal Law and Order Act, which 
enhanced the sentencing authority of tribal courts and required “reporting of 
federal declination rates, and [the] creation of the Indian Law and Order 
Commission.”123 Second, Congress included Sections 904 and 905124 in VAWA 
2013, recognizing the sovereign right of tribes, so long as they met certain 
criteria, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians committing acts of 
domestic or dating violence against Indian victims in Indian country. VAWA 
2013 further required that the offender live in or work on that tribe’s land, or 
that the offender was otherwise sufficiently tied to the tribe as a spouse or dating 
 
119 See supra notes 36, 40, 57 and accompanying text (discussing congressional plenary power in 
Indian affairs); see also, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution authorizes 
Congress to permit tribes, as an exercise of their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute nonmember 
Indians.”). Lara affirmed Congress’s ability to recognize tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember 
Indians, which the Court had previously found invalid. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692 (1990), 
superseded by statute, Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C § 1301, as recognized in 541 U.S. 193. 
120 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
121 Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE, 113, 114 (1995). 
122 VAWA 2005, supra note 113, § 901(5). 
123 Riley, supra note 25, at 1585; see also Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 
§ 212, 124 Stat. 2258, 2267 (2010) (“The United States Attorney shall submit to the Native American 
Issues Coordinator to compile . . . information regarding all declinations of alleged violations of 
Federal criminal law that occurred in Indian Country that were referred for prosecution by law 
enforcement agencies . . . .”). 
124 These sections are codified in 25 U.S.C. § 1304, but I will refer to the sections in the Act 
for purposes of this Comment. 
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partner of the victim.125 In Section 904, Congress declared that “the powers of 
self-government of a participating tribe include the inherent power of that tribe, 
which is hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise special domestic violence 
criminal jurisdiction over all persons.”126 While tribal courts retain concurrent 
jurisdiction with the federal government, VAWA 2013 was a step towards 
recognizing that the usurpation of tribal sovereignty was a contributor to 
lawlessness in Indian country, and that a functional solution is to start 
transferring back to, or sharing prosecutorial power with the tribes. 
The language of the special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction 
provisions in Section 904 was largely taken from a 2011 Senate bill introduced 
by Senator Daniel Akaka called the Stand Against Violence and Empower 
Native Women Act (SAVE Native Women Act).127 The original intent of this 
legislation was to provide tribes with adequate resources for prosecuting 
offenders who committed violent crimes against Indian women.128 A 
background report submitted to accompany the bill acknowledged the focus on 
the “crisis of violence against women in tribal communities,” remarking that 
rates of both domestic violence and sexual assault against Indian women were 
significantly higher than the national average.129 After recognizing the inclusion 
of concurrent tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians only for crimes of domestic 
and dating violence in Indian country, the report goes on to consider that “tribal 
nations may be best able to address violence in their own communities.”130 
Despite the victory for tribal sovereignty evident in the language within 
VAWA 2013 as enacted, prosecution of certain crimes of physical and sexual 
violence by non-Indians committed in Indian country remains fractured. The 
jurisdictional grant was originally intended only in “very limited 
circumstances,”131 and currently it can only be exercised if tribes meet certain 
procedural criteria and if the prosecution can establish the requisite connections 
between the tribe, non-Indian offender, and the victim. There is no tribal 
jurisdiction over crimes involving two non-Indians132 or if the “defendant 
 
125 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904(b)(4)(B), 
127 Stat. 122 (Mar. 7, 2013) [hereinafter VAWA 2013]. 
126 Id. § 904(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
127 See S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 8 (2012) (“[S]ections 904 and 905 of [VAWA] are taken almost 
entirely from S. 1763, the . . . SAVE [Stand Against Violence and Empower] Native Women Act . . . 
which is based on a Department of Justice proposal submitted to Congress on July 21, 2011 in 
anticipation of the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act.”). 
128 S. REP. NO. 112-265, at 7 (2012); see also VAWA Reauthorization Legislation Unveiled in Senate, 
ABA WASH. LETTER (Dec. 2011) (describing the purpose of the VAWA reauthorization to expand 
support services for victims and provide resources to those who prosecute violent crimes). 
129 S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 7 (2012). 
130 Id. at 8. 
131 Id. at 9. 
132 VAWA 2013 § 904(b)(4)(A)(i). 
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lacks ties to the Indian Tribe.”133 In addition, the jurisdiction only applies to 
criminal conduct that constitutes domestic violence, dating violence, or defined 
violations of protection orders.134 Thus, there are multiple dimensions to the 
“contacts” requirement beyond the identities of the parties because the 
defendant must have some sort of relationship to the tribe and to the victim. 
VAWA 2013 also made clear that tribes may only be able to exercise special 
domestic violence jurisdiction when non-Indian defendants’ rights are properly 
taken into account. Thus, any non-Indian defendant tried under Section 904 
jurisdiction must have, for example, the right to a trial by an impartial jury.135 
Congress also included a catch-all provision for defendants’ rights: tribes 
exercising special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction must provide for “all 
other rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution . . . in order 
for Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent power of the participating tribe 
to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over the defendant.”136 
Given these jurisdictional limitations and qualifications, policymakers 
may have reasoned during VAWA 2013’s drafting that reaffirming inherent 
tribal sovereignty to prosecute certain non-Indian crimes committed in 
Indian country could only be done incrementally. Or, that despite the 
limitations, the Act as written would still significantly address the problem of 
sexual violence, or that without incorporating more stringent requirements 
of the perpetrator’s connections to an Indian tribe and victim, due process 
would be threatened. Whatever considerations motivated the limitations in 
VAWA 2013, one may argue (as I do here) that by not covering all non-Indian 
crimes of sexual violence or all crimes ancillary to dating and domestic 
violence in Indian country, the jurisdictional grant did not go as far as it 
lawfully could or should have gone.137 
Still, support for the narrow jurisdictional grant even with these 
limitations was by no means universal. Some questioned the constitutionality 
of recognizing such jurisdiction at all.138 Opponents in Congress also felt 
 
133 See id. §§ 904(b)(4)(B)(i)–(iii) (limiting tribal jurisdiction over only defendants who reside 
and/or are employed in the Indian country of the participating tribe, or who are spouses or intimate 
or dating partners of a member of the participating tribe or an Indian who resides in the Indian 
country of the participating tribe). 
134 See id. §§ 904(c)(1)–(2). 
135 Id. § 904(d)(3). 
136 Id. § 904(d)(4). 
137 See DEER, supra note 3, at 105 (noting that Senator Dorgan, the former Chair of the Senate 
Indian Affairs Committee, publicly reported the need to extend the jurisdiction to include all violent 
crimes of rape and child abuse, but it never became a part of any proposed VAWA legislation). 
138 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-480, at 58 (2012) (responding to criticism over a House bill version 
that did not include the special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction provision: “It is an unsettled 
question of constitutional law whether Congress has the authority under the Indian Commerce 
Clause to recognize inherent tribal sovereignty over non-Indians”). 
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there were better alternative avenues to address sexual violence in Indian 
country than to recognize tribal sovereign power to do so, such as increased 
funding for federal prosecution efforts.139 The two key legal arguments in 
opposition to the limited jurisdiction found in the legislative record were 
concerns for defendants’ individual rights and belief that Congress lacked the 
constitutional power to recognize tribal sovereignty over non-Indians. The 
next two sections of this Part will outline these arguments and responses in 
VAWA 2013, and then consider their application to an extension of tribal 
jurisdiction to additional crimes in Indian country perpetrated by non-Indians 
who do not have a relationship to the victim beyond the crime itself. 
B. Concern for Defendants’ Rights 
Many opponents of the special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction 
were concerned for defendants’ rights and the inability of tribal courts to 
afford necessary protections. This is not a new argument, and was put forth 
in Oliphant.140 Then-Senator Sessions argued if a non-Indian were subject to 
tribal jurisdiction, the individual “would enjoy few meaningful civil-rights 
protections” due to the “racially-exclusive nature” of tribal governments.141 And 
speaking at a town hall about the Senate bill, Senator Charles “Chuck” Grassley 
reasoned that “under the laws of our land, you got to have a jury that is a 
reflection of society as a whole, and on an Indian reservation, it’s going to be 
made up of Indians, right? So the non-Indian doesn’t get a fair trial.”142 
Despite reassurances (and requirements) that non-Indian defendants be 
tried by an impartial jury, there was consistent opposition during the 
congressional debates regarding the potential bias against non-Indians in 
tribal courts, as well as other procedural avenues available in state and federal 
courts.143 Other senators opposing the Senate bill argued during hearings that 
 
139 See S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 37 (2012) (opposition decrying § 904 as “shockingly cursory” 
about the grant of jurisdiction); id. at 37-38 (improving law enforcement in Indian country, instead 
of extending jurisdiction to tribal courts, can be done by allowing the federal government to retain 
jurisdiction and “to provide the appropriate resources necessary to fulfill those important 
responsibilities”). 
140 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1978) (citing Crow Dog for 
the proposition that non-Indians should not be subject to the customs and procedures of a “different 
race” in tribal courts, even for crimes committed against Indians in Indian country). 
141 S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 48-49 (2012). 
142 Scott Keyes, Top GOP Senator: Native American Juries Are Incapable of Trying White People 
Fairly, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 21, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/02/21/1619501/chuck-
grassley-native-americans/ [https://perma.cc/Q3Y5-U3P2]. 
143 See 159 CONG. REC. S614 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2013) (statement of Sen. Lee) (“I believe we 
must seek to minimize the potential for bias against non-Indian defendants under such circumstances 
. . . . While many tribal courts have proven to be as consistent and fair as traditional courts, the 
possibility of removal and appeal is key to the oversight that U.S. citizens rightfully expect.”). 
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the majority “cites no evidence of need for the change. It does not explain 
why its proposed solution is the right one, will effectively address the problem 
and will not raise additional problems, and will not establish any negative 
precedent for the future.”144 
Proponents of the jurisdictional grant addressed these constitutional 
concerns with amendments to the original Senate bill. First, they noted that any 
participating tribes who plan to exercise the special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction only can do so “contingent on the ability to provide non-Indian 
defendants with the rights required under law.”145 Language to address fears of 
partial juries and lack of due process was later incorporated into the text of the 
Act.146 In short, the Senate Majority responded to concerns that the 
jurisdictional grant was too expansive by stating that it was “narrowly crafted 
and satisfies a clearly identified need.”147 
VAWA 2013 further required that all rights guaranteed in the Indian Civil 
Rights Act must be provided for in any tribal prosecution brought under 
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction.148 These include, but are not 
limited to, the right to defense counsel, the right to publicly available criminal 
laws, and the right to seek habeas relief in federal court.149 
These rights would be equally provided for if Congress recognized tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians committing all crimes of sexual 
violence, as well as concurrent crimes of domestic and dating violence, such as 
child or elder abuse, against Indian victims in Indian country. By still requiring 
some ties to the tribe—through residence or employment or a comparable 
relationship—these non-Indian defendants are sufficiently on notice that a 
crime committed against an Indian in Indian country can be subject to tribal 
 
144 S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 37-38 (2012). 
145 Id. at 10 n.24. 
146 In the text of the bill considered on April 25, 2012, there was no language discussing specific 
rights of defendants to an impartial jury of peers; rather, the text said tribes shall provide “all other 
rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of the United States in order for 
Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over the defendant.” 112 CONG. REC. S2715 (daily ed. Apr. 
25, 2012). VAWA 2013 as passed specifically discusses constitutional rights of defendants. See supra 
notes 135–136 and accompanying text. 
147 S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 10 (2012). 
148 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012) (listing and describing the rights a tribe must afford to a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding). 
149 Id. § 1303. When tribes applied to implement VAWA jurisdiction in the pilot program, they 
had to complete an application and questionnaire in which the first question is, “will the Tribe 
provide to the defendant the right to a trial by an impartial jury that is drawn from sources that 
reflect a fair cross section of the community and do not systematically exclude any distinctive group 
in the community, including non-Indians?” See, e.g., AMENDED APPLICATION OF THE SISSETON-
WAHPETON OYATE, VAWA PILOT PROJECT QUESTIONNAIRE ON TRIBAL CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/pages/attachments/ 
2015/03/13/sisseton_wahpeton_app.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PEH-L8DN]. 
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law if Congress authorizes it.150 And other rights—to an impartial jury, defense 
counsel, etc.—must still be provided by the participating tribe. Further, no 
other jurisdictional grants to a sovereign to prosecute violent crimes require a 
prosecutor to differentiate based on the relationship between the victim and 
the offender.151 Common understandings of criminal jurisdiction in both 
federal and international law do not normally require a relationship between 
(i) the perpetrator and the sovereign in whose territory the offense was 
committed, and (ii) the perpetrator and the victim.152 
A potential counterargument here is that by extending the tribal 
jurisdiction to any non-Indian crime involving sexual violence and all possible 
charges pertaining to domestic or dating violence, tribal jurisdiction would 
slowly extend to all non-Indian crime. But as federal Indian law is currently 
understood, Congress has plenary power to recognize or limit tribal powers.153 
Thus, it is not a question of whether Congress can make such an extension in 
this circumstance, but whether Congress should. And in this case, there is a 
clear, identified problem of sexual violence and violent attacks in Indian 
country against Indian victims, primarily by non-Indian offenders.154 
If Congress passes legislation recognizing tribal jurisdiction to prosecute 
all non-Indian crimes of sexual, domestic, and dating violence—including 
ancillary crimes—under VAWA’s mandate, tribal authorities would waste less 
 
150 Currently, only Congress can expand or retract tribal authority as it pertains to non-Indians. 
See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain 
is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to 
complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers.”). 
151 While some state criminal codes treat marital rape—an offense that inherently requires a 
relationship between victim and offender—differently than other forms of rape, this does not alter 
jurisdictional authority. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-70b (2015) (treating sexual assault in 
spousal or cohabiting relationship as a class B felony, requiring proof of the “use of force”); IDAHO 
CODE § 18-6107 (2010) (“No person shall be convicted of rape for any act or acts with that person’s 
spouse, except” if the victim cannot resist due to use of force, a clear, objective threat to use force, 
or due to an intoxicating or narcotic substance); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520l (1988) (“A person 
may be charged and convicted [of rape] . . . even though the victim is his or her legal spouse. 
However, a person may not be charged or convicted solely because his or her legal spouse is under 
the age of 16, mentally incapable, or mentally incapacitated.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2013) 
(charging a person who has raped a spouse as “sexual battery,” and only “if the legal spouse engaged 
in forcible sexual penetration without the consent of the alleged victim”). It is precisely the 
relationship between the two married parties that resulted in the historical marital rape exemption. 
See SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (1736) (“But the husband 
cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual 
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto the husband, 
which she cannot retract.”). 
152 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing how criminal jurisdiction is normally 
limited by territorial, rather than relational, boundaries, but not both). 
153 See supra notes 36, 40, 57 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s plenary powers in 
Indian affairs). 
154 See supra Section II.A. 
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time evaluating any sort of relationship between the parties beyond what is 
already necessary (i.e., the identity of the parties as Indian or non-Indian) 
and thus deciding which sovereign possesses jurisdiction. 
C. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty and Sources of Power 
Even with the legislation accounting for non-Indian defendants’ 
constitutional rights, opponents of Section 904 argued it was not clear Congress 
possessed the constitutional power to recognize tribal inherent power rather 
than delegate sovereign power to tribes in this regard. When a tribe exercises 
its inherent sovereign authority, it is not subject to most constitutional 
constraints, though they can be imposed by statute.155 Thus, while the relevant 
VAWA 2013 provisions incorporated defendant rights into the statute, because 
the criminal authority exercised would be a tribe’s inherent power, rather than 
a delegated power of Congress, it would not guarantee defendants their full 
constitutional rights as would be the case in federal court. 
Senator Grassley, in arguing to strike the jurisdictional grant from the Act 
during Senate debates, protested that “the majority insisted on giving Indian 
tribal courts criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian Americans for the first time 
in our country’s history.”156 Citing a report from the Congressional Research 
Service, he reasoned that there were constitutional concerns exacerbated by 
language referencing “trib[al] criminal jurisdiction as part of their claimed 
inherent sovereignty,”157 instead of delegating congressional power to the tribes 
to prosecute crimes where the Constitution and Bill of Rights would apply.158 
 
155 See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381-83 (1896) (recognizing that even though Congress 
possesses the right to regulate tribal nations and their use of local power, such local power is not 
federal in origin, arising from and created by the Constitution); see also Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 313-14 
(finding that the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to valid tribal 
prosecutions because the exercise of tribal power to punish member offenses is an exercise of 
inherent sovereignty). VAWA 2013 already imposes such restraints by requiring tribes to afford due 
process in courts before they are able to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. 
VAWA 2013, supra note 125, § 904(d) (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)). 
Tribes are subject to the Thirteenth Amendment, however, because this particular 
constitutional constraint applies to all actors, not only states or the federal government. CLINTON 
ET AL., supra note 2, at 265. 
156 Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Support for Alternative VAWA Bill (Apr. 26, 2012), 
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/support-alternative-vawa-bill [https://perma.cc/
JJ79-334R]. But see supra subsection I.B.1 (discussing historical evidence of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians). 
157 Press Release, supra note 156. 
158 See JANE M. SMITH & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42488, 
TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS IN THE VAWA REAUTHORIZATION AND 
THE SAVE NATIVE WOMEN ACT 7 (May 15, 2012) (“If Congress is deemed to have delegated to 
the tribes Congress’s own power to prosecute crimes, the whole panoply of protections accorded 
criminal defendants in the Bill of Rights will apply. If . . . Congress is permitted to recognize the 
tribes’ inherent sovereignty . . . the Constitution will not apply.”). 
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Several Republican representatives in the House were equally concerned 
with the language used. For example, Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgers 
proposed an amendment as a substitute that did not eliminate the grant of 
jurisdiction, but removed all language regarding “inherent sovereignty” and 
required more deference to the Attorney General in determining whether to 
grant such jurisdiction to a tribe.159 Representative Kevin Cramer voiced his 
support for the amendment for fear that otherwise, using language of inherent 
tribal sovereignty would be “giving up the moral high ground for a political 
slogan that does nothing to protect the victims of violence.”160 
Not all members of the Republican House agreed, however. 
Representative Thomas “Tom” Cole, a member of the Chickasaw Tribe, wrote 
a letter read during the debates that emphasized his disagreement with 
McMorris Rodgers’s bill because it “fail[ed] to recognize existing tribal 
sovereignty that is enshrined in the Constitution.”161 Ultimately, the 
substitute language failed to receive enough votes on the floor, and within an 
hour, the House passed the version of the bill that recognized the jurisdiction 
as an exercise of inherent sovereign power by a tribe.162 
In both the House and the Senate, supporters of the provision’s language 
stating that jurisdiction would be an exercise of inherent sovereign power 
rather than federally granted power were resolute. First, they cited Oliphant 
as evidence that Congress does have the power to affirmatively extend tribal 
authority and that many tribes have already been recognized for having the 
capacity to ensure the procedural protections included in the provisions.163 
Second, they cited Lara, where the Supreme Court upheld congressional 
authority to recognize tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians,164 
 
159 See 113 CONG. REC. H769 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2013) (“A participating tribe is authorized to 
exercise jurisdiction in accordance with this section over an alleged offender who commits a covered 
offense.”); see also id. (“[T]he Attorney General shall make a determination as to whether the tribe, 
in exercising special domestic violence jurisdiction, is able to afford, and provides adequate 
assurances that the tribe will afford, an alleged offender all the rights described.”). 
160 Id. at H737 (statement of Rep. Cramer). 
161 Id. at H772. Sarah Deer, who co-authored the Amnesty International report, “Maze of 
Injustice,” credited Congressman Cole for being able to reach his fellow Republican colleagues and 
understand “the plight coming from the perspective of the Native person.” Mary Hudetz, “We’re Not 
Done”: MacArthur Fellow Sarah Deer Finds Justice for Native American Victims of Violence, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2014/09/22/were-not-
done-macarthur-fellow-sarah-deer-finds-justice-for-native-american-victims-of-violence/ [https://
perma.cc/D8HV-2YAG] (quoting Sarah Deer). 
162 113 CONG. REC., at H799-800. 
163 See S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9 n.23 (2012) (“The Minority Views . . . erroneously suggest that 
it is not within Congress’s power to authorize tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. To the contrary, 
the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress has the power to recognize and thus restore tribes’ 
‘inherent power’ to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians and non-Indians.” (citing Oliphant)). 
164 Id.; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (“Congress does possess the 
constitutional power to lift the restriction on the tribes’ criminal jurisdiction.”). 
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which had been previously curtailed in Duro.165 Thus by analogy, and 
considering the historical recognition of both inherent tribal sovereignty and 
congressional plenary power to regulate Indian affairs, Congress may validly 
possess the power to recognize tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian 
country. Of course, Lara did not involve criminal authority over non-Indians, 
but the Supreme Court has not curtailed criminal jurisdiction of tribes since 
Oliphant, where Justice Rehnquist called upon “Congress to weigh in deciding 
whether Indian tribes should . . . be authorized to try non-Indians.”166 
One may argue, however, that the limitations in the civil context of tribal 
sovereignty over non-Indians should likewise apply to extensions of criminal 
jurisdiction. In Montana, for example, the Court approved the exercise of 
tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians no further than what would be 
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control a tribe’s internal 
relations.167 But this comparison is strained. Beyond the actual type of 
jurisdiction exercised, what separates the circumstances in VAWA’s 
jurisdictional grant from the Montana line of cases is that here, Congress 
affirmatively and expressly recognized inherent tribal sovereignty to exercise 
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the principle of 
inherent tribal sovereignty in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle.168 Angela Riley 
recognized the critical importance of the decision, even if it did not directly 
relate to federal Indian law: 
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion, joined by Justice Kennedy, affirmed the 
inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes and distinguished it from that of Puerto 
Rico, which, according to the Court, enjoyed only delegated authority from 
the United States. In doing so, the Court reinforced a vision of robust, 
inherent tribal sovereignty, full and complete except to the extent those rights 
have been limited or divested by Congress.169 
 
165 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
166 Supra note 120. 
167 See 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (“Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to 
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations,” including 
“activities of non-members who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members” and 
if non-Indian conduct “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”). Note, however, that Montana was a case involving 
civil and regulatory jurisdiction related to land owned by non-members. Id. at 549. 
168 See 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2016) (reasoning that “unless and until Congress withdraws a tribal 
power—including the power to prosecute—the Indian community retains that [sovereign] authority 
in its earliest form”). 
169 Angela R. Riley, Native Nations and the Constitution: An Inquiry into “Extra-Constitutionality”, 
130 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 191 (2017) (footnotes omitted). 
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Ultimately, it remains to be seen how—with changes in the composition 
of the bench170—the Supreme Court will address a future challenge to the 
inherent-versus-delegated authority dispute stemming from Congress’s 
recognition of tribal jurisdiction in VAWA 2013. But given the plenary power 
of Congress over Indian affairs,171 the historical record showing some tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,172 and the evident problem of sexual 
and domestic violence in Indian country,173 Congress should—within its 
constitutional power—be able to affirm tribal criminal authority over 
additional non-Indian crimes in Indian country. 
IV. IMPLEMENTING AND EXPANDING TRIBAL 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
Until the Supreme Court emphatically suggests otherwise, then, 
Congress should possess the legitimate authority to recognize inherent 
sovereign power of Indian tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians 
who commit crimes of sexual violence against Indians without a spousal or 
dating relationship, as well as ancillary crimes committed during acts of 
domestic or dating violence (such as child abuse or endangerment). Right 
before VAWA 2013 was put to a vote in the Senate, Senator Patrick Leahy 
urged Congress to “move beyond partisan politics in order to provide help to 
victims of domestic and sexual violence,” regardless of the victim’s status as 
an immigrant or membership in an Indian tribe.174  
If Congress argues that recognizing the special domestic violence 
jurisdiction (as it currently stands) will address the problem of sexual violence 
 
170 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Legislating in Light of the Ideology and Politics of the Super-
Legislature (On Obama Care and an Oliphant fix), TURTLE TALK (June 25, 2012), 
https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/legislating-in-light-of-the-politics-of-the-super-legislature-on-
obamacare-and-an-oliphant-fix/ [https://perma.cc/R65C-ALW5] (“[D]uring the VAWA Reauthorization 
and SAVE Native Women Act debates, Dems assumed the constitutionality of a partial Oliphant 
fix. Under current law, it’s obviously constitutional. But the Supreme Court can change things. And 
it does, as Indian law observers know.”). While Justice Gorsuch has not opined on a Supreme Court 
case involving Indian law as of this writing, he has a generally favorable record towards Indians as a 
Circuit judge. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Neil Gorsuch Indian Law Record as Tenth Circuit 
Judge, TURTLE TALK (Feb. 1, 2017), https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2017/02/01/neil-gorsuch-
indian-law-record-as-tenth-circuit-judge/ [https://perma.cc/FQS3-3SDE]. 
171 See supra notes 36, 40, 57 and accompanying text (discussing congressional plenary power 
in Indian affairs). 
172 See supra subsection I.B.1. 
173 See supra Section II.A. 
174 Press Release, Leahy, Crapo Reintroduce Bipartisan Bill to Reauthorize the Landmark Violence 
Against Women Act (Jan. 22, 2013), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-crapo-reintroduce-
bipartisan-bill-to-reauthorize-the-landmark-violence-against-women-act [https://perma.cc/6CZ8-SD2R] 
(emphasis added); see also 159 CONG. REC. S613, S616 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“I am proud that 
our bill seeks to support all victims, regardless of their immigration status, their sexual orientation 
or their membership in an Indian tribe.”). 
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in Indian country against Indian women, then an extension to help victims of 
all forms of domestic and sexual violence will only provide further protection 
to such victims. As the data discussed in Part II illustrate, non-Indian violence 
against Indians is not limited to domestic or dating partnerships, but occurs 
at the hands of strangers and non-spousal relatives as well.175 This final Part 
reviews current implementation of tribal jurisdiction, and how and why 
recognizing tribal jurisdiction for additional non-Indian crime is both feasible 
and recommended. 
A. Implementation of Current VAWA Tribal Jurisdiction 
The special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction granted in VAWA 2013 
took effect two years after it was enacted, except in cases where tribes requested 
to participate on an “accelerated basis” through a Pilot Project.176 Before March 
7, 2015, five tribes from five different states were able to participate.177 
The gradual implementation appears to be an overall success, both 
ensuring that defendants have adequate procedural rights in tribal court and 
that more victims are receiving access to justice.178 According to Senator Lisa 
Murkowski: “All indications suggest that the Special Domestic Violence 
Criminal Jurisdiction provisions of the Violence Against Women Act are 
being successfully implemented."179 
As of March 2017, a total of thirteen tribes had implemented the 
jurisdiction, resulting in “84 arrests; 19 guilty pleas; 5 referrals for federal 
prosecution; 1 jury acquittal; 16 dismissals; and 4 pending cases.”180 In May 
 
175 See supra Section II.A. 
176 § 908(b)(2)(A). Under VAWA 2013, the Attorney General has the power to award grants of 
$5,000,000 to be appropriated annually through 2018 to tribal governments in order to strengthen 
their criminal justice systems. §§ 904(f)–(h). It is not immediately clear how effective this funding 
will be or if it will be authorized. Given that then-Senator Sessions, one of the strongest opponents 
of Section 904, is now Attorney General, concern that insufficient funding for resources and training 
will continue to be a problem in prosecuting crimes of sexual violence may be warranted. 
177 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VAWA 2013 PILOT PROJECT (Mar. 13, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/tribal/vawa-2013-pilot-project [https://perma.cc/8X53-p3AY] (listing the 
accepted Pilot Project applications from different tribes in Montana, Oregon, Arizona, South 
Dakota, and Washington). 
178 See Riley, supra note 25, at 1572 (“[I]mplementation has been a success in several respects. 
Tribes have provided defendants with requisite procedural protections, and the preliminary data 
reveal that the laws are improving the safety and security of reservation residents.”). 
179 Press Release, Sen. Tom Udall, Udall, Murkowski, Cortez, Masto Bill Would Restore Tribal 




180 Rebecca M. Howlett, The Need to Preserve and Expand Tribal VAWA Jurisdiction, LAW360 
(Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/898989 [https://perma.cc/7MAJ-ZAB6]. 
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2017, a jury composed of tribal and non-tribal members became the first to 
convict a non-Indian defendant for a tribal charge of domestic violence under 
VAWA 2013 in the Pascua Yaqui Tribal Court.181 And as of this writing, no 
defendant has challenged one of these tribal charges or convictions via federal 
habeas relief.182 
Collaboration and coordination across tribes and between tribal, state, and 
federal entities has also promoted successful implementation. For example, 
over forty-five tribes are participating in an Intertribal Technical-Assistance 
Working Group (ITWG) in order to share best practices on how to 
implement jurisdiction and safeguard both victim and defendant rights in the 
process.183 Trainings across the country for tribes and with relevant state and 
federal representatives promote a coordinated response to domestic violence 
investigations and potential prosecutions while ensuring the integrity of the 
judicial process.184 
B. Expanding Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction 
The results and impact of VAWA 2013 are being watched closely by a 
variety of interested parties. In the Senate, for example, the Committee on 
Indian Affairs is reviewing feedback from tribes and introducing legislation 
to “fix the[] gaps” identified.185 Moreover, now that the pilot project is 
complete, due to its success, “the push for a full and complete Oliphant ‘fix’ 
has also increased, particularly as evidence mounts that tribes can and do 
protect the constitutional rights of non-Indian defendants in tribal court.”186 
 
181 See Debra Utacia Krol, Pascua Yaqui Tribe First to Use VAWA to Prosecute Non-Indian, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY, June 9, 2017, https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/politics/pascua-yaqui-
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their door open, and who had previously been on probation for a violation for strangling his wife). 
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Office, the Federal Defender’s Office, the Montana Department of Justice and tribal court 
practitioners, and tribal judges”). 
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186 Riley, supra note 169, at 190; see also NAT’L INDIGENOUS WOMEN’S RESOURCE CTR. & NAT’L 
CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, TRIBAL CONSULTATION VAWA 2013, SECTION 903 11 (Sept. 25, 
2017), http://www.niwrc.org/sites/default/files/documents/Resources/consultation_vawa_webinar_final.pdf 
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Congress should acknowledge the gaps still present in the legislation, and 
consider expanding its recognition of jurisdiction. 
Given the heated debates surrounding the limited grant of jurisdiction, it 
is hardly surprising that proponents of the provisions argued that the safer 
approach was to “narrowly” construct the jurisdictional grant so as to “win 
support in Congress.”187 There was no proposed amendment or discussion—
beyond pointing out how limited the grant of jurisdiction was—arguing for 
legislation that would cover additional crimes. 
Legal scholars and organizations are urging Congress to expand the grant 
after reviewing the success of the current implementation of the special 
domestic violence jurisdiction. In an interview, Professor Sarah Deer, a 
citizen of the Muscogee Creek Nation, pointed out that there is cause for 
celebration in VAWA 2013, but also noted that the legislation failed to cover 
child abuse or the “broader topic of sexual assault.”188 Amnesty International 
pressed Congress to reaffirm that tribal authorities have jurisdiction over “all 
offenders who commit crimes on tribal land, regardless of . . . identity.”189 
In addition to extending tribal jurisdiction for all non-Indian sexual 
assault in Indian country, recognizing jurisdiction over concurrent crimes to 
domestic and dating violence acts would promote greater intergovernmental 
efficiencies and justice for all Indian victims. Child abuse and endangerment 
during domestic and dating violence is perhaps one of the greatest examples 
to illustrate how VAWA 2013 still perpetuates the jurisdictional conundrum 
in Indian country. Deborah Parker, the former Vice Chair of the Tulalip 
Tribes of Washington, testified in front of Congress before VAWA 2013 was 
enacted, describing her own experience being abused as a child and 
exemplifying how personal stories humanized the plea for jurisdiction.190 
Parker’s case, if it occurred today, could not be investigated and prosecuted 
by her tribe, because as a child, she was not in a spousal or dating relationship 
with her attacker.  
This remains true even after the enactment of VAWA 2013. For example, 
Sharon Jones Hayden, a Tulalip Tribal Prosecutor, described at a 2015 DOJ 
conference a case where she was able to charge a defendant with domestic 
violence for beating his wife who was Indian, but could not bring any charges 
 
[https://perma.cc/N5TS-WFF5] (noting as a priority issue to discuss with the Attorney General, in annual 
consultation pursuant to Section 903 of VAWA 2013, the “[n]eed for [a] complete Oliphant fix to address 
sexual assault and other domestic violence appendage crimes”). 
187 Horwitz, supra note 11. 
188 Hudetz, supra note 161. 
189 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 12, at 12. 
190 Women Senators, Tribal Leader Discuss Importance of VAWA Improvements, YOUTUBE (Apr. 25, 
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yIV7-XASQy8 [https://perma.cc/U3DJ-YHQN] (recounting 
her own experience with sexual assault as a child, asking Congress why the lives of Indian women “matter 
less,” while pressing for VAWA authorization to include tribal criminal jurisdiction). 
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against him for child abuse when he whipped her child with a lamp cord.191 
In another case, Hayden, who is specially designated to prosecute cases in 
federal court, successfully brought federal charges against a non-Indian man 
who had attacked his girlfriend and her children, including “strangling her, 
hitting her with a metal pipe, throwing knives and lamps at her, and 
threatening to kill her and burn the house down with her small children 
inside.”192 Because this case was considered so severe, it had been referred to 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office, otherwise the tribal government would have been 
unable to charge the defendant for attacking these children, which included 
forcing a two-year-old to sit in a chair and throwing knives at him.193 
In fact, multiple bills have been introduced since VAWA 2013 proposing 
extending (or restoring) tribal jurisdiction over additional crimes. First, 
Senators Jon Tester and Al Franken introduced a bill called the Tribal Youth 
and Community Protection Act of 2016 that would have amended VAWA 
2013 Section 904 to include tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian crimes of child 
violence.194 Second, the Justice for Native Survivors of Sexual Violence Act, 
introduced in October 2017 by Senators Franken, Lisa Murkowski, and Tom 
Udall would extend tribal jurisdiction to crimes of “domestic, dating, or sexual 
violence, sex trafficking, or stalking.”195 Finally, in December 2017, Senators 
Udall, Murkowski, and Catherine Cortez Masto introduced legislation to 
extend tribal jurisdiction to include crimes against children and law 
enforcement officers.196 No action has been taken on these bills since they 
were referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs. 
A commonsense extension of tribal criminal jurisdiction, affirmed by 
Congress, would be to all non-Indian crimes of sexual assault occurring in 
Indian country and involving an Indian victim, and all ancillary crimes 
involved in acts of domestic or dating violence, including the child abuse 
discussed above. Section 904 can be amended to include definitions of sexual 
assault and rape, and the ancillary crimes committed during domestic and 
dating violence. The “ties” requirement to the tribe, through residence or 
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192 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Man Who Assaulted Girlfriend and Child on Tulalip Tribal 
Land Sentenced to Nearly Six Years in Prison (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
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194   Tribal Youth and Community Protection Act, S. 2785, 114th Cong. (2016). 
195    Justice for Native Survivors of Sexual Violence Act, S. 1986, 115th Cong. (2017). 
196   The Native Youth and Tribal Officer Protection Act, S. 2233 115th Cong. (2017).  
786 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 745 
employment in Indian country or through a spousal or dating relationship to 
the victim, can remain. Section 904(c)(1), listing the criminal conduct covered, 
would be amended to include sexual assault and rape, and “domestic and dating 
violence and associated ancillary crimes.” The same constraints currently in 
Section 904(d) regarding defendant’s rights would remain the same. 
While policymakers feared Section 904 would threaten the current 
jurisdictional balance, their primary concerns—rights of non-Indian 
defendants and limiting “tribal sovereignty”—embody a history of federal 
control over the land, culture, and decisions of Indian tribes. The plenary power 
over all Indian affairs still delineates Congress’s power to expand, retract, and 
control tribal authority. In VAWA 2013, Congress has formally recognized both 
the problem of non-Indian violence against Indian victims and also the power 
of Congress to affirm tribal sovereignty over these perpetrators. A potential 
solution to federal overreaching is to continue to gradually localize law 
enforcement in tribal governments while respecting the constitutional (and 
international) rights of victims and offenders.197 Congress should continue to 
restore tribal sovereignty over the land and people in Indian country in this 
instance, for sexual assault and rape, domestic and dating violence and ancillary 
crimes, against all Indian victims in Indian country.198 
CONCLUSION 
As history reflects, inherent tribal sovereignty existed well before the 
ratification of the Constitution and formation of the United States, and some 
tribes exercised jurisdiction over non-Indians before and after that time.199 
Now that VAWA 2013 is law, and “inherent tribal sovereignty” survived the 
legislative gauntlets, all Indian persons living in Indian country should be 
protected from sexual assaults committed by any perpetrator, regardless of 
race or citizenship, or ties to the victim. Congress’s plenary power as currently 
formulated may permit the recognition of tribal sovereign authority to 
 
197 See Riley, supra note 25, at 1619-20 (“[O]ne proposed remedy for the current [criminal 
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199 See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (noting that “the existence of the right in 
Congress to regulate the manner in which the local powers of the Cherokee Nation shall be exercised 
does not render such local powers Federal powers arising from and created by the Constitution of 
the United States” and further explaining that “the powers of local self government enjoyed by the 
Cherokee nation existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the Fifth 
Amendment”). 
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prosecute non-Indians for the crimes listed in Section IV.B, against an Indian 
in Indian country. And federal and state governments should continue 
collaborating with tribal courts to ensure the adequacy of resources and tools 
to effectively integrate this jurisdiction into their systems. 
This Comment has discussed the realities of sexual violence in Indian 
country, stemming from a deeply troubling history of colonial violence and 
domination of Indian land and Indian bodies. Just as rape was used as a 
weapon throughout history, modern political barriers to remedy assaults 
perpetuate a similar narrative. Congress has the power to redirect that 
narrative by recognizing special criminal jurisdiction to tribes over non-
Indians offenders committing crimes of sexual violence as well as ancillary 
crimes of domestic and dating violence against Indian victims in Indian 
country. The arguments presented in the VAWA 2013 debates against any 
grant of jurisdiction failed, and are similarly unsustainable—or at the very 
least, are indistinguishable—when applied to eliminating the relationship 
requirement between the victim and offender. And early evidence of tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians reflects that Rehnquist’s 
generalizations in Oliphant did not accurately document the jurisdictional 
landscape in Indian country. Tribes possessed, and should still possess, the 
right to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their people. VAWA 2013’s 
jurisdictional grant, albeit narrow, should ultimately galvanize policymakers 
and advocates to ensure through new legislation that there is redress for all 
victims, not only those who must rely on evidence of the perpetrator’s 
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